Multifamily Development: From Construction Through Lease-Up

Key Takeaways

Two Phases, One Deal

Multifamily development is not one phase of work. It is two distinct economic regimes joined at a single moment in time. The construction phase, which runs 24–36 months for institutional product, is entirely uses-side: capital flows out to land, hard cost, soft cost, and capitalized interest, with zero revenue. The lease-up phase, which runs 6–18 months on top of construction, is a mixed regime: operating expenses and cash debt service are live, rental income ramps from zero up to a stabilized run-rate, and the gap is bridged by a lease-up reserve until net operating income covers debt service.

The moment that joins them is the Certificate of Occupancy (the C of O), and it is the moment to model line by line. The lender-funded interest reserve that carried the loan through construction depletes shortly after C of O. A separate, smaller operating-deficit reserve takes over. The occupancy clock that governs agency take-out eligibility starts running. Each of those mechanics has its own clock, and they don't all fire on the same day. Practitioners who model the development as a single "to stabilization" timeline collapse the inflection and miss the months where the deal is most likely to break.

This article walks the full lifecycle of an institutional multifamily ground-up as one integrated modeling problem. The audience is development analysts and VPs underwriting merchant-build and build-to-core sponsors; capital markets associates sizing construction debt and the eventual take-out; LP investors reviewing sponsor pro formas before subscription; and acquisitions analysts evaluating recently delivered Class-A product still in lease-up. The running deal example is a 280-unit garden-style ground-up in a Sun Belt submarket, $62.5M total project cost, 30-month construction plus 12-month lease-up, carried through every section.

Phase 1: Construction (24-36 Months)

The construction phase begins when the construction loan closes. Pre-development costs (land contract deposits, predevelopment legal, civil engineering, entitlement consulting, geotechnical and environmental reports) are typically capitalized into the basis carried into closing. At closing, the construction lender funds the initial draw to take down land and reimburse capitalized soft costs, unless the loan requires equity to fund first. From that day forward, every dollar that enters the project enters as a use; nothing enters as revenue.

Monthly progress draws follow the classic S-curve: slow in months 1–6 as sitework, demolition, and foundation work proceed; peak velocity in months 7–22 during vertical construction, MEP rough-in, envelope, and drywall; tapered through months 23–30 as finishes, FF&E, and common areas come online and the leasing center opens. The construction-loan mechanics (AIA G702/G703 contractor's applications for payment, 10% retainage on hard costs, monthly lien-waiver compliance, and independent construction management consultant inspections) are walked in detail in our companion piece onconstruction loan draw schedules and interest reserves. For the development walkthrough, the relevant takeaway is that the loan's average outstanding balance depends on the shape of the draw curve and on whether equity funds first. In the worked example below, with equity in first, the loan averages roughly 44% of its commitment over the 30 months but is nearly fully drawn by C of O, so the interest reserve has to be sized month by month to that curve, not to a flat half-loan assumption.

Debt service during construction is paid by a lender-funded interest reserve. The reserve sits in sources and uses as a line item inside the construction loan itself: the lender funds the reserve out of loan proceeds, and the loan accrues interest on the reserve as it does on any other drawn balance. This is the structural reason there is no cash debt service from the sponsor during construction: every interest payment is "paid" by drawing on the reserve, which is itself part of the loan. The loan grows against itself as construction proceeds.

Equity and debt fund the project in a sequenced ratio. Many construction lenders require sponsor equity to fund first, the "equity-in-first" structure. For a $62.5M project with $18.5M equity and a $44M construction loan, the first $18.5M of project costs are paid from equity (land takedown, initial site work, early soft cost burn), and the construction lender funds every dollar thereafter. By the Certificate of Occupancy date, all $18.5M of equity is invested and the construction loan is drawn close to its full commitment. The funding ratio progression is a one-way street: equity goes in first, loan goes in second, and neither one is returned until refinance or sale.

The C of O Moment

The Certificate of Occupancy is the discrete inflection that separates the two phases. In a phased delivery (typical for garden-style and large podium product), C of O issues building by building over a 3–6 month delivery window; in a single-building mid-rise or high-rise, it issues all at once on a single date. The modeling convention used here is to treat the date of first leasable unit as the C of O moment, even when later buildings deliver weeks or months afterward. HUD's MAP Guide uses the same anchor: its operating-deficit calculation begins when the first Certificate of Occupancy is secured.

Four mechanics shift around that date, and they do not all fire on the same day:

• Revenue begins. The first leases sign in the days and weeks leading up to C of O for units that will be ready at delivery; revenue posts as rent commencements after C of O. In an institutional pro forma, gross potential rent goes from zero to a small fraction of stabilized in the first month and ramps from there.

• The lender-funded interest reserve depletes. The reserve is sized to cover interest through construction completion plus a short "stub" past C of O (about 55 days in the worked example). Once that window passes, the reserve is empty and the construction loan still has interest accruing. The borrower must now service the loan in cash, either from operations (which won't cover for months) or from a separate reserve.

• The lease-up operating-deficit reserve takes over. This is a separate, smaller reserve sized to cover the operating deficit during lease-up. HUD 221(d)(4) requires an Initial Operating Deficit escrow sized from a month-by-month lease-up deficit analysis (MAP Guide 7.14.1), on top of a4% working capital reserve; balance-sheet lenders negotiate the number deal by deal. The reserve funds: real estate taxes (now assessed on improved value), property insurance, base property management staffing, leasing commissions and marketing, free-rent concessions burning through signed leases, and the debt service shortfall between cash interest and lease-up NOI.

• The take-out clock starts. Agency lenders (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac) can refinance the construction loan before full stabilization under lease-up programs, but the window does not open at C of O. Fannie Mae's Near-Stabilization Execution requires 75% physical occupancy at rate lock; Freddie Mac's Lease-Up loan requires 50% occupied, 60% leased, and at least 60% of Certificates of Occupancy issued at rate lock, and 100% of them issued at closing. C of O starts the occupancy count that gets the deal there.

This section matters because the four mechanics fire on overlapping but not identical timelines. The interest reserve depletes on a deterministic date (the day the last drawable interest dollar is drawn). The operating-deficit reserve begins funding on the day operations begin (typically C of O itself, sometimes a few weeks earlier when the leasing center opens). Revenue posts as leases sign. And the agency take-out is a future-state option whose value depends on rate environment at the time of refinance, which the sponsor doesn't control. The deal lives or dies in the gap between when the interest reserve runs out and when lease-up NOI covers cash debt service, with the operating-deficit reserve bridging the difference.

For the 280-unit example, model the C of O as the start of month 31 (after 30 months of construction). The interest reserve has roughly 55 days of stub. The operating-deficit reserve was sized at $1.8M (approximately 4% of the construction loan), enough to cover the cumulative deficit in a stress case at 15 units/month, where 92% occupancy slips from late month 11 to month 16. Pre-leasing, which began in month 25 with the leasing center opening (inside the three-to-six-month pre-marketing window the MAP Guide describes), has produced 24 signed leases at C of O. Move-ins take physical occupancy from 0% to roughly 9% in month 31 and to roughly 27% by month 33. In month 31, collected effective rent of about $24K (new move-ins pay for half the month, net of the 1.5-month concession) runs against about $110K of operating expenses, while the interest reserve stub still pays the monthly interest. The stub runs out after month 32. In month 33 the lease-up reserve absorbs the full gap: $242K of cash interest plus $127K of operating expenses against $123K of rent, a deficit of about $246K for the month.

Phase 2: Lease-Up (6-18 Months)

Lease-up is the period from C of O to stabilization. The ranges below are illustrative underwriting ranges drawn from practitioner experience, not figures from a single published source. General-occupancy garden-style multifamily typically underwrites 10–20 units per month of net absorption. Tier 1 Sun Belt metros (Atlanta, Dallas, Phoenix, Charlotte) absorb 15–25 units/month in healthy markets and 8–15 in oversupplied submarkets. Mid-rise and high-rise product runs slower because the move-in friction is higher (elevator scheduling, finish-out coordination, larger unit floor plates), typically 8–15 units/month for general-occupancy product. Whatever pace goes into the model should be supported by comparable lease-ups in the submarket; HUD's MAP Guide requires that support, where comparables exist, for the absorption rate behind its own operating-deficit estimate.

For the 280-unit garden-style example, model a 12-month lease-up at an average net absorption of 22 units/month. Months 1–3 run about 25 units/month as pre-leased units commence and initial marketing pull is strongest; months 4–8 hold at roughly 24 units/month; months 9–12 taper from about 22 units in month 9 to about 11 in month 12 (roughly 17 a month on average) as the marketing-elastic demand exhausts and the property converges on stabilized occupancy. Net absorption nets out the early-cycle move-outs that show up around month 6 onward (job relocations, lifestyle changes); the occupancy path in the example is already net of them.

Concession burn-off is the second leg of the lease-up math. As an illustrative convention, properties opening into a competitive submarket offer 1–2 months free on a 13-month lease; aggressive submarkets push to 2–3 months free on a 13–14 month lease. The face rent on the rent roll is the asking rent; the effective rent (the rent the property actually collects) is the face rent net of concession amortized over the lease term. A 2-month concession on a 13-month lease is a 15.4% effective rent discount; a 3-month concession on a 14-month lease is 21.4%. The concession burn-off is when concessions stop being offered on new leases, once management has demonstrated absorption and pricing power has returned. For the example, model concessions of 1.5 months on a 13-month lease for months 1–8 (an 11.5% effective discount on new leases), tapering to 0.5 month in months 9–10 (at about 78% occupancy) and zero in months 11–12.

The NOI ramp is the financial output of the absorption curve. Month 1 NOI is materially negative: operating expenses are live (base management, taxes, insurance, marketing, leasing commissions) but rental income is a fraction of stabilized. In the worked example, with operating expenses modeled as 55% fixed and 45% scaling with occupancy (an illustrative assumption), NOI turns positive in month 4 as occupancy passes the mid-30s, covers the $242K of monthly construction interest from month 10, and runs at roughly 86% of the stabilized run-rate in month 12. Physical occupancy reaches 92% late in month 11; holding it for a full quarter runs past the 12-month lease-up. Economic stabilization, defined as trailing NOI annualizing to a level that supports the take-out underwrite, lags physical stabilization because the trailing window captures concession burn-off and ramping expenses.

The relationship between net absorption pace and lease-up reserve drawdown is the most important sensitivity in the development model. At 22 units/month, the operating-deficit reserve in the example funds about $1.0M of cumulative deficit through month 9, after which NOI covers interest, and the deal reaches the take-out with about $0.8M of the $1.8M reserve unused. At 15 units/month (the oversupplied end of the illustrative range), 92% occupancy slips to month 16, NOI does not cover interest until month 13, and the cumulative deficit rises to about $1.5M, leaving roughly $0.3M of cushion. At 12 units/month, the reserve is exhausted in month 12 and the sponsor has to fund roughly $0.14M more of operating deficit from equity or from a contingency reserve before NOI covers interest in month 16. This is the failure mode that takes capital from "performing" to "underperforming" without ever defaulting on debt service.

Unit mix interacts with absorption pace in ways the simpler models don't capture. Studios and 1BRs lease faster but at higher annualized turn; 2BRs and 3BRs are slower to lease but stickier once leased. Density economics (whether the deal is garden, mid-rise, or high-rise) drive both the absorption pace ceiling and the rent premium structure; see our sibling piece ongarden vs mid-rise vs high-rise density economics for the institutional breakdown of how density format changes the underwrite. The rent roll itself, which becomes the central artifact of the stabilized underwrite, is the subject of our multifamily underwriting fundamentals piece.

Agency Take-Out at Stabilization

The institutional construction loan is a transient structure. It exists to fund construction and bridge lease-up; it is not designed to sit on the asset long-term. The take-out is the moment the construction loan is refinanced into permanent debt, and for institutional multifamily it often lands on an agency loan from Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac (or in some cases HUD 221(d)(4) as a single-close construction-to-permanent product, as covered in our piece on HUD/FHA 221(d)(4) construction-to-perm).

Two specific agency programs are designed for the C2P transition:

• Fannie Mae Near-Stabilization Execution. Refinances partially leased, newly constructed or recently renovated properties before full stabilization. Per aJune 2026 Lument term sheet, it requires minimum physical occupancy of 75% at rate lock, sizes to a Tier 2 maximum of 75% of as-stabilized value and a minimum 1.25x DSCR, measures that DSCR on the performance Fannie Mae deems achievable within four months after rate lock, and disburses full loan proceeds at closing, with 12 months of interest-only payments. It is the natural take-out for a lease-up that is close to, but not yet at, stabilization.

• Freddie Mac Lease-Up. Refinances or finances the acquisition of newly constructed properties where stabilization is expected within 12 months of funding. PerGreystone's 2026 term sheet, the property must be 50% occupied and 60% leased with at least 60% of Certificates of Occupancy issued at rate lock, and have all of them issued at closing. The loan sizes at 75% of as-stabilized value and 1.25–1.35x DSCR, and carries a Lease-Up Credit Enhancement of at least 5% of the unpaid principal balance that is released once the property achieves the required amortizing DCR; if it doesn't within 12 months, the enhancement is used to resize the loan. The sponsor locks the rate earlier in lease-up in exchange for that enhancement, which is valuable when the rate environment is volatile or expected to move higher.

The qualifying thresholds matter for modeling. For the 280-unit example, model the take-out as a Fannie Mae Near-Stabilization Execution loan that locks its rate around month 40 (lease-up month 10, about 84% physical occupancy, above the 75% minimum) and closes at month 42, refinancing the $44M construction loan. The example assumes Fannie Mae accepts the $4.5M stabilized NOI as achievable within four months of rate lock. At a 5.10% cap rate that NOI implies an $88.2M stabilized value, so even a 65% LTV loan (below the 75% Tier 2 maximum) would be $57.4M; but at an assumed 5.85% 10-year fixed rate on a 30-year schedule, a $57.4M loan would run only about 1.11x DSCR. The 1.25x DSCR test binds first, at roughly $50.9M, which refinances the $44M construction loan and returns roughly $6.9M of the $18.5M equity before closing costs. The 5.85% rate is an illustrative assumption, not a quoted rate.

That $4.5M assumption is generous. Four months after the month-40 lock (lease-up month 14), most of the leases signed in lease-up months 1–8 still carry the 11.5% concession discount, because they roll only at the end of their 13-month terms. On the example's own lease-up model, in-place NOI then annualizes to about $4.0–4.1M, which at 1.25x and 5.85% would size the loan to about $45–46M and return only about $1–2M of equity. The $50.9M figure assumes the lender underwrites to post-burn-off market rents; waiting for the last concession cohort to roll (around month 51) would run past the 42-month construction loan term.

The take-out rate environment is the single largest external variable in the development pro forma. On this example, a 1% move in the take-out rate moves the DSCR-constrained loan by roughly $5–6M ($45.8M at 6.85% and $56.9M at 4.85%, against $50.9M at 5.85%), and a 1% move in the cap rate (5.10% to 6.10%) moves stabilized value by about $14.5M. Sponsors who underwrote 2021–2022 starts against much lower exit caps are refinancing into smaller take-outs than they underwrote. The C2P transition modeling, which DV-003 walks line by line, is the place where this rate risk gets quantified.

The 2026 Supply Environment

The 2026 development underwrite cannot be lifted from a 2021 model. The supply environment, the debt cost environment, and the absorption environment all moved materially.

Starts swung sharply month to month. The U.S. Census Bureau's New Residential Construction release showed starts in buildings with five or more units at a 316,000 seasonally adjusted annual rate in May 2025 (preliminary), down 30.4% from April's then-reported 454,000; the current Census series puts May and April 2025 at 324,000 and 429,000. For the full year, Census counts 396,900 5+ unit starts in 2025, up from 336,200 in 2024.

Sentiment pointed to recovery; the hard data is mixed. The NMHC March 2026 Quarterly Construction Survey showed 48% of respondents reporting starts unchanged from three months earlier, 31% reporting they are starting more projects, and only 12% starting fewer (down from 25% in December). Starts rose into midyear (494,000 in April and a revised 519,000 in June, around a dip to 282,000 in May), then fell back. Census data showed 5+ unit starts falling 15.6% month-over-month in July 2026 to a 421,000 annualized pace from June's then-reported 499,000 (both later revised, to 444,000 and 519,000), then dropping a further 22.5% in August 2026 to 344,000, 15.5% below August 2025. Census's 90% confidence intervals on the July and August declines (±20.2 and ±24.9 percentage points) both include zero. The financing outlook stayed positive but cooled. The NAIOP CRE Sentiment Index for spring 2026 (survey conducted March 18–26, 2026) came in at 52, down from the September 2025 survey; respondents still expected the availability of debt and equity to improve, but less than they had in the fall, and named construction costs a binding constraint on development activity. Agency loan purchase caps for 2026 are $88B each for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ($176B combined), with at least 50% of their multifamily business required to be mission-driven affordable housing, and the MBA's 2026 CREF forecast, as reported by REBusiness, projects multifamily originations of $399.2B in 2026, up from an estimated $330.6B in 2025.

Sun Belt lease-up needs a slower stress case. Submarkets still absorbing the 2022–2024 deliveries are where the 12-month lease-up is least safe. This article runs a 15–17 month lease-up as the stress case for those submarkets (an illustrative assumption, not a published benchmark). For the 280-unit example, a Tier-1 Sun Belt submarket can credibly underwrite a 12-month stabilization in 2026 only if the immediate competitive set has thinned; a submarket with several competing lease-ups delivering at the same time should be underwritten at the slower pace.

Development spreads are the gating test. Recently delivered Class A in lease-up competes against concession-heavy neighbors, so its effective rent lags face rent even where stabilized product is recovering. The go/no-go test is the development spread (yield-on-cost minus going-in cap). Many sponsors look for roughly 150–175 bps before breaking ground (an illustrative rule of thumb, not a published standard), and the construction-cost pressure NAIOP's respondents describe is the cost side of that same test.

Worked Example: 280-Unit Sun Belt Garden

A 280-unit garden-style ground-up in a Tier-1 Sun Belt submarket. Total project cost $62.5M ($223K all-in per unit), 30-month construction plus 12-month lease-up, 42 months from land closing to stabilization. The full sources and uses:

Sources and uses for the worked example. The construction loan is the dominant capital source, with sponsor and LP equity at 29.6% of total cost. The interest reserve is sized from a month-by-month S-curve draw model, the lease-up reserve ($1.8M of the $2.4M financing line) is sized to the stress case, and the contingency is 5% of hard + soft cost. Percentages are rounded.

The construction loan is $44M at SOFR + 300 bps (an illustrative spread; with SOFR averaging about 3.59% in May 2026 per New York Fed data, the all-in rate is approximately 6.6%), 30-month term plus a 12-month lease-up tail (42 months total). The interest reserve is sized to $3.65M: a month-by-month S-curve draw model with equity funding the first $18.5M produces about $3.2M of construction-period interest, and the remaining ~$0.44M carries roughly $240K a month of post-C of O interest for about 55 days. At full draw, interest on $44M at 6.6% is $242K a month. The lease-up reserve is sized at $1.8M (approximately 4% of the construction loan), which covers the 15 units/month stress case.

Yield on Cost and Development Spread

Stabilized NOI on the example (the run-rate once the concession leases have rolled, not the month-42 in-place figure) is $4.5M: $26,400/unit average annual rent on 280 units times 92% economic occupancy gives $6.80M of effective gross income; less operating expenses of $8,250/unit ($2.31M, an illustrative assumption) gives stabilized NOI of $4.49M, rounded to $4.5M below. Yield on cost, the foundational development metric, is stabilized NOI divided by total project cost: $4.5M / $62.5M = 7.20%.

The example assumes a 5.10% going-in cap rate for stabilized Sun Belt garden-style Class A multifamily (an illustrative assumption). At that cap the development spread is 210 bps, comfortably above the hurdle. A 25 bps rise in market cap rates (to 5.35%) combined with a 5% cost overrun ($65.6M of cost, a 6.86% yield on cost) would push the development spread to about 151 bps, at the bottom of the band and no longer comfortable. A 50 bps rise (to 5.60%) combined with a 10% cost overrun ($68.75M of cost, a 6.55% yield on cost) pushes the development spread to about 95 bps: the deal still cash flows, but doesn't compensate the equity for development risk relative to buying a similar stabilized asset.

The development spread interacts with the take-out math directly. At a 7.20% yield on cost, the $4.5M of stabilized NOI supports about $50.9M at 5.85% on a 30-year schedule and 1.25x DSCR; the LTV test does not bind (65% of the $88.2M value is $57.4M, and the 75% Tier 2 maximum would be $66.2M). At a ~6.55% yield on cost, which is what a 10% cost overrun does to the example ($4.5M against $68.75M of cost), the NOI still supports the same loan in absolute terms, but sponsor equity rises from $18.5M to $24.75M, so the equity return falls. The sensitivity is more pronounced on the equity multiple than the loan sizing.

Where the Math Breaks

Three failure modes show up in 2026 deals, each connecting back to a modeling decision the analyst made before the deal closed:

• Lease-up reserve depletes before NOI covers cash debt service. Modeled absorption was 22 units/month; actual delivered 12–15 because a competing lease-up opened in the same submarket 90 days ahead. At 15 units/month the $1.8M reserve survives with about $0.3M left; at 12 units/month it runs out in month 12 of lease-up, and the sponsor has to fund the remaining months of operating deficit from equity (a sponsor capital call) or from a contingency reserve if one was sized in. The deal stays performing on debt service, but the extra equity and the later take-out pull the equity IRR down, and the sponsor's promote crystallization gets delayed.

• Concession burn lasts longer than modeled. The submarket has 2–3 competing lease-ups delivering within 6 months of yours. Effective rent runs 8–15% below face rent through month 18, not month 11 as modeled. Stabilized NOI lands at $4.0M rather than $4.5M because of the depressed effective rent persisting into the trailing window for the take-out. At $4.0M of NOI the 1.25x DSCR test at 5.85% sizes the take-out to about $45.2M, roughly $5.7M below the $50.9M base case. That $4.0M is close to the example's own in-place NOI four months after a month-40 lock, so this failure mode is only one lender decision away from the base case.

• The take-out doesn't size to par. Trailing NOI fell short, or the take-out rate moved against the deal, or both. With $4.0M of NOI and a 6.85% take-out rate, the 1.25x DSCR test sizes the near-stabilization loan to about $40.7M, short of the $44M construction balance it was supposed to refinance. The sponsor has to recapitalize the roughly $3.3M gap with mezzanine debt (expensive; an illustrative 12–15% coupon), preferred equity (similar economics, slightly better structure), or a sponsor capital call. The take-out structure becomes one of the most consequential modeling decisions; our piece on bridge loans and floating-rate exit assumptions walks the structural alternatives in more depth.

Each of these failure modes is foreseeable with the right modeling discipline: a stress case on absorption pace, a stress case on effective rent persistence, and a stress case on take-out rate movement, all running in parallel with the central case. A disciplined underwrite reports central, downside, and severe-downside cases for every variable, with the severe-downside case engineered to test whether the equity survives or has to recapitalize.

From Pro Forma to Institutional Model

Every section of this article reflects a discrete piece of math that an institutional development model has to carry: S-curve construction draws against a hard and soft cost budget, capitalized interest solved iteratively against the loan balance, the C of O inflection with two reserves handing off, a lease-up module with configurable absorption and concession burn, the NOI ramp through stabilization feeding the take-out underwrite, and a full equity waterfall with promote hurdles tied to LP returns at refinance or sale. The math itself is mechanical; the structural integration (making one model carry both phases without stitching together a construction model and a stabilized model by hand) is the hard part. A model that does one phase well and the other approximately will miss the C of O handoff; the institutional pro forma carries both end to end.

For a deeper walk on the rent roll mechanics that feed the stabilized NOI build, see our piece onmultifamily underwriting fundamentals and the rent roll. For the calculator-style breakdown of how operating expenses scale across unit count and unit mix, see ourrental property pro forma calculator piece. For the density-format breakdown that drives both the hard cost budget and the absorption pace ceiling, seegarden vs mid-rise vs high-rise density economics.

Related Articles

• Rental Property Pro Forma Calculator: the operating-side companion that walks NOI build and operating expense scaling on stabilized multifamily.
• Garden vs Mid-Rise vs High-Rise: Density Economics: how density format changes hard cost, rent premium, and absorption pace ceiling.
• Multifamily Underwriting Fundamentals and the Rent Roll: the central artifact of the stabilized underwrite that the development model feeds into.
• Construction Loans: Draw Schedules and Interest Reserves: the deep dive on S-curve draw mechanics, the circular reference, and interest reserve sizing.
• HUD/FHA 221(d)(4) Construction-to-Perm: the agency alternative to the bank-construction-plus-take-out structure walked here.
• Bridge Loans: Floating-Rate Risk and Exit Assumptions: the structural cousin when the take-out doesn't size to par and the sponsor needs a bridge to a future refinance.

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