Office Market Analysis: Sublease, Hybrid Work, and the 2026 Submarket Spread

Key Takeaways

A Bifurcated 2026 Recovery

The office market is recovering — selectively. National sublease availability has fallen for eight consecutive quarters and reached 101 million square feet in Q1 2026, down 13.6% year-over-year per Cushman & Wakefield's MarketBeat. Net absorption is positive for the eighth consecutive quarter at +6.9 msf in Q1 2026 per CBRE's U.S. Office Figures. Taking rents are growing at the fastest pace in six years (+2.7% YoY). Construction completions of 1.3 msf in Q1 2026 are the lowest quarterly total since CBRE began tracking in 1990. By every supply and demand input the institutional underwriter cares about, the trajectory is improving.

And yet headline vacancy is still 18.6% nationally (CBRE Q1 2026). Office CMBS delinquency hit an all-time high of 12.34% in January 2026 before pulling back 114 basis points to 11.20% in February on five large modifications and extensions, per Trepp. Newmark estimates $930 billion of CRE debt matures in 2026 alone, with the average maturing coupon of 4.76% refinancing into a 6.24% market. The Manhattan-versus-San Francisco vacancy spread is more than 1,000 basis points (13.1% vs. 23.3%); the Sun Belt CBD recovery in Nashville, Charlotte, and Miami sits next to Austin and Dallas above 20%. The national average is the wrong unit of analysis.

This article walks the institutional framework for reading the 2026 office market — sublease as the leading demand indicator, the four-way vacancy taxonomy that makes a broker quarterly legible, hybrid work translated from HR policy to a demand curve, the Q1 2026 submarket spread, the shadow-vacancy three-form taxonomy, the distress wave overlay with Trepp and Newmark data, flight to quality, the conversion pipeline, and the structured workflow for producing the BOV-grade output. The audience is the acquisitions analyst, asset manager, capital markets professional, or debt underwriter producing an office output with Q1 2026 broker reports open in adjacent tabs, not the headline skimmer.

Reading the Broker Quarterly: Direct vs. Available vs. Gross-Available vs. Shadow

The CBRE Figures report leads with a single number: "U.S. office vacancy 18.6% in Q1 2026." JLL's Office Outlook leads with another: "70% of firms now have in-office policies." Cushman's MarketBeat leads with a third: "national sublease availability 101 msf, down 13.6% YoY." CommercialEdge's monthly report leads with 17.6% (April 2026). The practitioner reading four broker quarterlies sees four different headline numbers and needs the taxonomy that reconciles them.

The institutional vacancy framework has four layers:

• Direct vacancy. Space marketed by the landlord that is not currently under lease. This is the "supply" number in the strictest sense — physically empty space the owner is actively trying to lease. Direct vacancy is what a 1995 underwriter would have called "vacancy." It is also what the typical CoStar / Yardi default screen returns when an analyst pulls "submarket vacancy" without further specification.

• Sublease availability. Space marketed by the tenant on their own leased premises — the tenant is paying rent under a master lease but is offering all or part of the space to a sublessee. Sublease does not reduce the landlord's rent roll, but it competes against direct supply for new tenant demand, and a rising sublease pipeline is the canonical leading indicator that corporate tenants are revising space needs downward.

• Gross available space. Direct vacancy plus sublease availability plus "soon to be available" space (known lease expirations within the next 12 months that the tenant has confirmed will not renew). This is the supply number the institutional underwriter uses for forward-looking absorption math. CBRE, JLL, and Cushman publish gross available alongside direct, but the headline "vacancy rate" usually quotes direct + sublease only.

• Shadow vacancy. Space under lease, not marketed by the tenant or the landlord, but not actively occupied. Shadow vacancy does not appear in any published broker series. It surfaces in building walks (lights off, badge swipes thin), in Kastle / building IoT utilization data, in tenant credit deterioration, and in renewal-cycle behavior at the comp-set level. The institutional underwriter estimates it explicitly, because it is the most important forward-looking risk signal the published reports cannot capture. Section 6 walks the three-form taxonomy.

The reconciliation discipline: when the analyst pulls the CBRE Q1 2026 Figures (18.6% national vacancy, 12.7% prime vacancy), JLL's Office Outlook (eighth consecutive quarter of positive absorption at 3.5 msf), Cushman's MarketBeat (101 msf national sublease availability), and CommercialEdge's monthly report (17.6% April 2026), the variance is usually less than 100 basis points and explainable by survey universe, submarket definition, and class-stratification methodology. The analyst picks one source as the methodological anchor (typically CBRE for institutional national work, Cushman for the sublease leading indicator, CommercialEdge for monthly cadence) and reconciles the others against it. The output is not a single number but a stratified read: direct vs. sublease vs. gross vs. shadow, by class and vintage, at the submarket level.

Sublease as the Leading Indicator

The CBRE, JLL, and Cushman quarterlies lead with headline vacancy. The institutional practitioner reads sublease first. Sublease availability is the strongest revealed-preference demand signal in the office market: corporate tenants put space on the sublease market when they have too much and pull it back when they have just enough or not enough. The 2020-2024 sublease balloon (national availability roughly doubled from 60 msf pre-pandemic to a peak above 165 msf in mid-2023, per Cushman) was the demand-destruction signal. The 2024-2026 plateau-and-recession is the firming signal that headline vacancy will follow, with a lag.

The Q1 2026 sublease story, by Cushman & Wakefield's MarketBeat:

• National sublease availability: 101 msf. Down 3.4% quarter-over-quarter, down 13.6% year-over-year. Eighth consecutive quarterly decline. Four-quarter rolling net absorption of 5.2 msf is the highest post-pandemic figure.

• Twelve markets with greater than 500,000 sf year-over-year sublease declines. The leaders: San Francisco (−2.2 msf), Midtown Manhattan (−2.1 msf), Dallas (−1.9 msf), San Jose (−1.4 msf), and Minneapolis/St. Paul (−1.1 msf). SF and Midtown Manhattan are the canonical gateway-recovery stories, with sublease leading the headline vacancy improvement. Dallas's sublease decline, notably, is firming despite headline vacancy still sitting above 20% — the leading indicator is faster than the headline.

• Sublease as a share of total available space. Sublease was 25-30% of total office availability at the 2023 peak in gateway CBDs; in Q1 2026 it sits closer to 18-22% across most major markets and has fallen below 15% in the recovering Sun Belt CBDs. The compression of sublease as a share of total availability is the clean signal that the demand-side of the market is firming.

The reverse signal — submarkets where sublease is still climbing — is the tell for continued demand weakness. As of Q1 2026, sublease is still rising or flat in a handful of secondary markets exposed to government, energy-sector restructuring, or persistent tech contraction; the institutional underwriter who sees a sublease series still climbing in a target submarket discounts the recovery thesis materially. The discipline is to walk three quarters of sublease trajectory, not just spot, and to read sublease in the context of the tenant base (a finance-heavy submarket with sublease falling is firming; a tech-heavy submarket with sublease still climbing is still adjusting).

Q1 2026 sublease trajectory by submarket (Cushman & Wakefield MarketBeat Q1 2026). Sublease as the canonical leading demand indicator. When the analyst opens a submarket file, the sublease trajectory chart is the first chart they pull — before the headline vacancy series, before the absorption series.

Hybrid Work: The Unresolved Demand Question

Most office market commentary in 2026 treats hybrid work as settled: "the office is not dead, the office has changed." The institutional underwriter does not have that luxury. Hybrid work is the unresolved underwriting variable that drives the 2026-2030 demand curve, and the empirical record is mixed enough that the prudent approach is to model it as a sensitivity input, not a settled fact.

The four empirical references the institutional reader integrates:

• Kastle Systems Back-to-Work Barometer. Badge-swipe data across 2,600 buildings and 41,000 businesses in major metros. December 2025 reading: 56.3% weekly average occupancy — an all-time post-pandemic high. A+ Class buildings ran 78.8%. This is the demand-side empirical floor. The gap-to-baseline is still material: pre-pandemic Kastle ran 90-100% (the index baseline was set at 100% in February 2020), so the 56.3% reading is still roughly 30+ percentage points below pre-pandemic. The trajectory is up; the level is still well below the pre-2020 norm. See Kastle's Back-to-Work Barometer.

• Stanford WFH Research (Bloom et al., SIEPR). The academic empirical anchor. Roughly 27% of paid full-time workdays now occur from home; 52% of remote-capable workers are in hybrid arrangements (3-4 days in office per week). Bloom's modeling projects that RTO mandates cut WFH from 21.2% to 20.8% of total days — a 0.4 percentage-point shift. The Stanford research consistently finds that productivity data has hardened the hybrid case rather than weakened it: the post-2020 productivity surge tracks WFH adoption. See Stanford WFH Research and the SIEPR policy briefs.

• JLL workforce composition survey. 18% fully remote / 67% hybrid (1-4 days in office) / 15% five-day in office. 70% of firms now have formal in-office policies (vs. 51% in 2024). Industry stratification: finance averaging 3.5-5 days, energy 3-4 days, tech still hybrid-leaning. See JLL U.S. Office Dynamics.

• The RTO mandate tracker. Per JLL Q2 2025 reporting, 54% of Fortune 100 employees are now subject to five-day-in-office requirements, up from 11% a year prior. Amazon and JPMorgan Chase have implemented five-day mandates; Google enforces a three-day-in-office policy. The mandate cohort is concentrated in finance and large tech, and the question for the underwriter is whether the mandate wave sustains beyond the current labor-market cycle that is enabling it.

Hybrid work empirical evidence as of Q1 2026. The institutional reader integrates the badge-swipe demand floor (Kastle), the academic empirical work on structural WFH share (Stanford / Bloom), the corporate workforce composition data (JLL), and the RTO mandate tracker. Translating to demand: each percentage-point shift in average "days in office per week" maps to a roughly proportional shift in effective office demand, modeled as a sensitivity input against the portfolio's geographic and tenant-industry exposure.

The underwriting translation: hybrid work is best modeled as a demand-curve sensitivity, not a point estimate. Bloom's projection that RTO mandates shift WFH by only 0.4 pp suggests the demand recovery already underway is structural — driven by absolute employment growth, formal policy shifts, and the trophy-tier flight to quality — rather than reversal of WFH. The conservative underwriter holds Kastle's December 2025 56.3% reading flat, models 0% growth in days-in-office over the hold, and lets supply-side discipline (35-year-low construction pipeline, conversion pipeline) and selective sublease firming carry the recovery thesis. The aggressive underwriter assumes Kastle drifts up 5-8 pp over a five-year hold as policy formalization continues and the 5-day-mandate cohort expands. The institutional model carries both as bookends.

The 2026 Submarket Spread

National averages mask the picture. The headline 18.6% Q1 2026 U.S. office vacancy (CBRE) is composed of submarket readings that range from Midtown Manhattan prime vacancy at 2.9% to Seattle CBD at 25.2%. The institutional underwriter does not underwrite to the national. The submarket is the unit, and the 2026 spread between submarkets is wider than at any point in the post-2008 cycle.

The framework groups submarkets into three tiers: gateway CBD, Sun Belt CBD, and suburban. Within each tier, the 2026 spread is significant.

The five submarket-tier reads, walked:

• Gateway CBD recovering (Manhattan, Boston). Manhattan office vacancy fell to 13.1% in Q1 2026 per CommercialEdge, with Midtown prime vacancy at 2.9% and Manhattan asking rents around $69/sf (the highest in the country). Sublease availability fell −2.1 msf YoY in Midtown. The drivers are AI / tech employment re-entering the market, a diversified employment base, the trophy / Class A+ tightening to functional full occupancy, and the structural advantage of mass-transit-served CBD locations. Boston at roughly 17% is firming more slowly but is moving in the same direction.

• Gateway CBD still repricing (San Francisco, Seattle). SF vacancy averaged 23.3% in April 2026 per CommercialEdge; sublease fell −2.2 msf YoY, the largest decline of any market, signaling that the recovery is underway but operating from a higher vacancy base. SF's recovery is repricing-driven — institutional capital is re-entering at materially lower per-square-foot bases, per GlobeSt reporting that NY and SF are leading the institutional repricing bid. Seattle at 25.2% is the laggard in the gateway tier, with tech-sector employment growth still soft.

• Gateway CBD contracting (Chicago, DC). Chicago at 18.2% is still soft, with office prices declining further per CommercialEdge's mid-2026 reporting; demand is contracting in the loop. DC sits in the high-teens / low-20s and is exposed to federal employment headwinds. Philadelphia leads the nation in office distress per Bisnow / Morningstar reporting. These markets are not on the recovery curve yet; the underwriter models them as ongoing risk exposures rather than recovery plays.

• Sun Belt CBD recovering (Nashville, Charlotte, Miami). Nashville has posted seven consecutive quarters of positive net absorption and sits below 15% vacancy. Charlotte's Q3 2025 average deal size was 141.6% above the five-year average per Avison Young / market reporting, with strong year-end leasing carrying into 2026. Miami declined from a 15.7% peak in early 2025 to roughly 12.5% in April 2026 per CommercialEdge — among the strongest-performing markets nationally. These submarkets are recovering on absolute demand growth (population, in-migration, financial-services employment growth) rather than on supply discipline.

• Sun Belt CBD softer (Austin, Dallas). Austin and Dallas are the only two Sun Belt markets running above 20% vacancy in Q1 2026 (Austin 21%, Dallas above 20% per CommercialEdge). Austin's softness is tech-driven — technology employment declined 1.6% and startup employment fell 4.9% in the trailing year, per market reporting. Dallas, by contrast, shows sublease firming materially (−1.9 msf YoY) despite the elevated headline vacancy, suggesting a lag rather than a structural problem.

The Q1 2026 submarket spread. National averages mask the picture; the spread between Midtown prime (2.9%) and Seattle CBD (25.2%) is more than 2,200 basis points. The institutional underwriter reads each submarket against its tier and its own three-quarter trajectory, not against the national.

The cross-cutting structural read: construction completions of 1.3 msf in Q1 2026 per CBRE are the lowest quarterly total since CBRE began tracking in 1990 — supply discipline is now the most underappreciated tailwind. The submarkets that have recovered (Manhattan, Miami, Nashville, Charlotte) have recovered partly on absolute demand growth, partly on supply-side discipline (no new construction adding to the overhang), and partly on the flight-to-quality bifurcation that pulls demand into trophy / Class A+ stock. The submarkets still working through overhang (SF, Seattle, Chicago) need both demand recovery and continued supply discipline, plus the conversion pipeline to relieve the structural excess. The class-and-vintage stratification matters: see the sibling article on trophy / Class A vs. Class B repositioning for the flight-to-quality framework that makes this submarket spread a within-asset spread, not just an across-asset one.

Shadow Vacancy: Three Forms

Beyond direct vacancy and sublease availability there is shadow vacancy — space technically leased and not on the market but unoccupied by the tenant. Shadow vacancy is invisible to the published broker series. It surfaces in building walks (lights off at 10am, badge swipes thin, sublease conversations beginning), in Kastle / building IoT utilization data where the underwriter has access to it, in tenant credit deterioration, and in renewal-cycle behavior at the comp-set level. It is the most underappreciated supply overhang in the 2026 office story, and the institutional underwriter estimates it explicitly when the lease ladder on the comp set requires it.

The three forms of shadow vacancy, walked:

• Form 1 — Post-RTO right-sizing shadow space. Tenant moved from 5 days in office to 2-3, kept the existing lease, and is using 40-50% of the leased footprint. Most common in 2024-2026 vintage 7-10 year leases signed pre-pandemic when space planners were modeling 200-250 sf per employee at 5-day occupancy. These tenants are not in distress; they are simply waiting out the lease term. The renewal probability at expiration is materially lower than the historical norm — the tenant will renew at a smaller footprint, will sublease the surplus, or will let the lease expire and consolidate into a smaller premises elsewhere. Common in gateway CBDs with finance / professional-services tenant bases.

• Form 2 — Corporate downsizing shadow space. Tenant has laid off staff or shrunk the business unit and is paying out the remaining lease term. Tracked imperfectly through workforce data (BLS metro-level employment by NAICS sector), tenant credit deterioration, and 10-K disclosures for public tenants. The renewal probability is near-zero; at lease expiration the space comes onto the direct vacancy series. The institutional underwriter who is reading shadow vacancy in a tech-heavy submarket (San Jose, Austin, Seattle) in 2026 is largely reading Form 2.

• Form 3 — Deferred-decision shadow space. Tenant has not yet committed to a renewal vs. sublease vs. early termination vs. negotiated lease modification. The lease is intact, the tenant is occupying the space at variable utilization, and the decision is being deferred until the broader market resolves. Most common in 2025-2026 with 12-24 months of remaining term and a tenant balance sheet that allows the option value of waiting. Renewal probability is uncertain; the underwriter's working assumption is roughly 50/50, adjusted by tenant industry and current utilization signal.

Quantifying shadow vacancy is hard. The institutional estimate — informed by First American's (Snyder) research, Colliers' shadow-space framework, and tenant-utilization data where it is accessible — is that shadow vacancy adds an estimated 5-15% of the leased stock in high-WFH-exposure submarkets (gateway CBDs, tech-heavy nodes), versus 0-3% in low-WFH-exposure submarkets (Sun Belt suburban Class A serving in-person tenants, medical office, government-anchored buildings). The underwriter's discipline: walk the building during normal business hours, pull the lease expiration ladder on the comp set, layer Kastle / building IoT utilization where accessible, identify which leases are likely Form 1 vs. Form 2 vs. Form 3, and discount the renewal probability accordingly when projecting the stabilized rent roll.

The renewal-probability discount framework: in a building with 50% lease exposure to high-WFH-likelihood tenants, a 70% historical renewal rate, and an estimated 30-40% Form 1 / Form 2 / Form 3 shadow utilization mix, the underwriter cuts the projected renewal rate by 800-1,500 basis points, lengthens the marketing period assumption by 3-6 months on the rolling leases, and raises the TI / free rent concession assumption on net-new leases. Shadow vacancy is what turns a building that looks 92% leased on the published rent roll into a building that underwrites to 78-82% effective economic occupancy. The sibling article on office TI, LC, free rent, and effective rent walks the leasing-economics layer that integrates with the shadow read.

The 2026 Distress Overlay

Office is the most distressed commercial real estate asset class in 2026. The Trepp CMBS office delinquency series hit an all-time high of 12.34% in January 2026 before pulling back 114 basis points to 11.20% in February on five large office modifications and extensions ranging from one month to roughly three years, per Trepp's CMBS Delinquency Report. The pullback does not represent resolution; it represents extend-and-pretend — lenders and special servicers granting time to borrowers in the expectation that interest rates or absorption will improve the underlying property's debt-service capacity. The wave is being managed, not yet resolved.

The supporting distress data, integrated:

• Vintage analysis (Trepp / Commercial Observer). 2014 CMBS pool: 60% of office loans paid off at or before maturity, 29% did not. 2019 pool: 42% paid off, 47% did not. 2024 pool: 57% of office loans failed to pay off — office is the most distressed asset class in the 2024 vintage. The deterioration across pool vintages tracks the WFH demand shock and the 2022-2024 rate spike interaction.

• The maturity wall (Newmark). Newmark estimates roughly $670 billion of CRE debt is "potentially troubled" maturing 2025-2027, with office and multifamily the most exposed asset classes. The 2026 component alone is $930+ billion of debt maturing across all CRE asset classes per Newmark's Q1 2026 Capital Markets Conditions & Trends report. Q1 2026 debt origination was $220 billion (+29% YoY) across 1,828 lenders; bank originations are up 58% YoY. Transaction volume in Q1 2026 reached $142 billion (+33% YoY, 21% above the 2017-2019 Q1 average).

• The rate-cap squeeze (Newmark). The average rate on maturing CRE debt is 4.76%, refinancing into a 6.24% market — a 148-bp coupon step-up. On an office property underwritten in 2017-2019 to a 4.50-5.00% senior debt rate at 60-70% LTV, the refinance into 6.00-6.50% at the same loan dollars produces a material DSCR shortfall. The shortfall is the proximate driver of the modification-and-extension wave: rather than force resolution at the maturity date and crystallize a workout sale, the special servicer extends.

• The OPI Chapter 11 worked example. Office Properties Income Trust (OPI), with 72 affiliated debtors and 125 properties totaling 17.3 million square feet across 29 states and DC (as of June 2025), confirmation hearing in April 2026 and Effective Date in June 2026, $272.9 million in dispositions May-Dec 2026, with Cash Basis NOI projected to grow from $145.5 million (May-Dec 2026) to $231.4 million (2030). OPI is the canonical portfolio-level workout of the 2026 cycle and the operator example the institutional analyst opens when modeling a similar workout.

The institutional reading of the distress wave is two-sided. For stabilized holders, distress is a comp-set risk: workout sales reset the submarket transaction comp set lower, which compresses appraised values and shrinks refinanceable LTV bands even on assets that are themselves performing. For opportunistic buyers, distress is the central 2026 entry opportunity. Hines's 2026 outlook ("Hines 2026 Outlook") argues that "evidence of a market bottom in 2025 appears increasingly clear" and identifies selective trophy / supply-constrained office as a buying opportunity. GlobeSt reports institutional capital re-entering NY and SF at materially lower per-square-foot bases. MSCI / Real Capital Analytics reports Q1 2026 office transaction volume of $20.5 billion, +39% YoY, with single-asset deal flow improving and entity-level activity returning for the first time in two years — the latter being a key signal that liquidity is broadening.

The bridge-debt overlay is integral to the distress story. A material share of the 2024-2026 office acquisitions have been financed with bridge debt to allow the buyer to execute a lease-up or repositioning plan before permanent financing. The bridge structure introduces floating-rate and exit-cap risk that the institutional underwriter models explicitly — see the sibling article on bridge loans, floating-rate risk, and exit assumptions for the debt structure that is fueling much of the 2026 office workout activity. The CMBS structure on the maturing legacy debt is covered in the sibling on CMBS conduit vs. SASB, defeasance, and yield maintenance.

The Institutional Workflow

With the framework laid out, the question becomes: how does the practitioner produce a defensible institutional office market analysis report? The answer is a structured nine-step workflow that integrates the broker quarterlies, the demand-side empirical data, the distress overlay, and the submarket spread into a one-page IC-ready output.

Two methodology notes that experienced practitioners build into the workflow. First, source reconciliation: the institutional analyst does not just pick one source and run. The CBRE Figures number, the JLL Office Outlook number, the Cushman MarketBeat number, and the CommercialEdge number are each computed off a slightly different survey universe, a slightly different submarket definition, and a slightly different class-stratification methodology. The variance is usually less than 100 basis points but is occasionally larger in submarkets where one source has thin coverage; the disciplined output names which source is the anchor and notes the reconciliation rather than presenting a single number as if it were definitive.

Second, the demand-side read in Step 7 is where the framework departs from the broker quarterlies. Kastle, RTO mandate exposure, and submarket-level NAICS employment growth are not in the CBRE / JLL / Cushman reports natively. The institutional analyst pulls them as independent overlays. The submarket whose vacancy is improving but whose Kastle reading is flat is improving on supply discipline and lease churn, not on demand expansion — a fragile recovery. The submarket whose vacancy is improving and whose Kastle reading is rising is improving on actual demand recovery — a durable recovery. The two look identical at the headline level. The Step 7 overlay is what distinguishes them. The methodology mirrors the institutional comp-set discipline covered in the multifamily-cluster sibling on rent comp analysis: the practitioner reads broker data through a structured framework, never as a substitute for the framework.

The output of the nine-step workflow is the one-page institutional office market analysis report that an acquisitions analyst hands into IC, that a capital markets professional includes as the market section of a BOV, that an asset manager uses as the market context in a portfolio variance review, that a debt underwriter cites in the market-risk paragraph of a CMBS or bridge-debt underwriting memo. The output is not the data — the underlying broker quarterly reports already contain the data. The output is the structured institutional reading that makes the data legible against the deal in front of the practitioner.

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Related Articles

• Office Underwriting: TI, LC, Free Rent, Effective Rent — the leasing-economics layer that integrates with the shadow-vacancy and renewal-probability discounting framework.
• Office Lease Analysis: Gross vs. NNN and Expense Stops — the lease structure pillar; the comp-set economics that feed Step 6.
• Trophy / Class A vs. Class B Repositioning — the flight-to-quality bifurcation that the 2,230-bps submarket spread is also a within-class spread.
• Rent Comp Analysis: Building Institutional Comp Sets for Multifamily Underwriting — the analytic-workflow analog in the multifamily cluster; the same broker-data-as-anchor discipline.
• CMBS Conduit vs. SASB, Defeasance, and Yield Maintenance — the CMBS structure on the legacy office debt feeding the Trepp delinquency series.
• Bridge Loans, Floating-Rate Risk, and Exit Assumptions — the bridge debt fueling 2026 office workouts and recapitalizations.

Sources

• CBRE — U.S. Office Market Report Q1 2026.
• CBRE — U.S. Real Estate Market Outlook 2026 · Office.
• JLL — U.S. Office Outlook Q1 2026.
• Cushman & Wakefield — U.S. Office MarketBeat Q1 2026.
• Newmark — 1Q 2026 U.S. Capital Markets Conditions & Trends.
• Trepp — CMBS Delinquency Report and Office Delinquency Series.
• Kastle Systems — Back-to-Work Barometer.
• Stanford WFH Research (Bloom et al.) — WFH Research and Policy.
• SIEPR — Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
• MSCI / Real Capital Analytics — U.S. Office Capital Trends Q1 2026.
• CommercialEdge / CommercialCafe — National Office Report (monthly).
• Yardi Matrix — U.S. Office Market Outlook.
• NAIOP — NAIOP Office Space Demand Forecast.
• PwC / ULI — Emerging Trends in Real Estate 2026.
• Hines — Hines 2026 Outlook.
• First American (Snyder) — Shadow Office Space and WFH.
• VTS — VTS Office Demand Index.
• Marcus & Millichap — Office Market Outlook 2026.
• Bisnow — Office-to-Residential Conversions Up 28% YoY.

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