Office Market Analysis: Sublease, Hybrid Work, and the 2026 Submarket Spread

Key Takeaways

A Bifurcated 2026 Recovery

The office market is recovering, selectively. National sublease availability has fallen for eight consecutive quarters and reached 101 million square feet in Q1 2026, down 13.6% year-over-year per Cushman & Wakefield's MarketBeat. CBRE reports positive net absorption for the eighth consecutive quarter in Q1 2026, while Cushman records -4.0 msf for the quarter and a four-quarter rolling total above +5.2 msf. CBRE's average asking rents rose 2.2% year-over-year, the fastest pace in six years. Construction completions of 1.3 msf in Q1 2026 are the lowest quarterly total since CBRE began tracking in 1990. By most supply and demand inputs the institutional underwriter cares about, the trajectory is improving.

And yet headline vacancy is still 18.6% nationally on CBRE's Q1 2026 count (20.2% on Cushman's). Office CMBS delinquency hit an all-time high of 12.34% in January 2026 before pulling back 114 basis points to 11.2% in February, per Trepp. Newmark's April 2024 estimate put roughly $2 trillion of CRE debt maturing over the following three years. The Midtown Manhattan-versus-San Francisco vacancy gap is more than 1,300 basis points (18.3% vs. 31.6% on Cushman's data); among the larger Sun Belt markets charted here, Miami and Nashville sit near 15-17% while Charlotte, Atlanta, Houston, Dallas, Phoenix, and Austin all run above 24%. The national average is the wrong unit of analysis.

Market data in this article are as of Q1 2026 unless noted. Cushman's Q2 2026 release shows available sublease space at 96 msf (down 15% year over year and 28% below its Q1 2024 peak), Q2 net absorption of -360,000 sf, and a four-quarter rolling absorption total of +14.3 msf.

This article walks the institutional framework for reading the 2026 office market: sublease as the leading demand indicator, the four-way vacancy taxonomy that makes a broker quarterly legible, hybrid work translated from HR policy to a demand curve, the Q1 2026 submarket spread, the shadow-vacancy three-form taxonomy, the distress overlay with Trepp and Newmark data, and the structured workflow for producing the BOV-grade output. The audience is the acquisitions analyst, asset manager, capital markets professional, or debt underwriter producing an office output with Q1 2026 broker reports open in adjacent tabs, not the headline skimmer.

Reading the Broker Quarterly: Direct vs. Available vs. Gross-Available vs. Shadow

The CBRE Figures report leads with a single number: U.S. office vacancy of 18.6% in Q1 2026. Cushman's MarketBeat leads with a different one: overall vacancy of 20.2% and national sublease availability of 101 msf, down 13.6% YoY. JLL's Q1 2026 read was net absorption of +3.5 msf. The practitioner reading the broker quarterlies side by side sees different headline numbers and needs the taxonomy that reconciles them.

The institutional vacancy framework has four layers:

• Direct vacancy. Space marketed by the landlord that is not currently under lease. This is the "supply" number in the strictest sense - physically empty space the owner is actively trying to lease. Direct vacancy is what a 1995 underwriter would have called "vacancy."

• Sublease availability. Space marketed by the tenant on their own leased premises - the tenant is paying rent under a master lease but is offering all or part of the space to a sublessee. Sublease does not reduce the landlord's rent roll, but it competes against direct supply for new tenant demand, and a rising sublease pipeline is the canonical leading indicator that corporate tenants are revising space needs downward.

• Gross available space. Direct vacancy plus sublease availability plus "soon to be available" space (known lease expirations within the next 12 months that the tenant has confirmed will not renew). This is the supply number the institutional underwriter uses for forward-looking absorption math. Brokers report availability measures alongside vacancy, but the headline "vacancy rate" counts only unoccupied direct and sublease space (Cushman defines overall vacancy as unoccupied new, relet, and sublet space).

• Shadow vacancy. Space under lease, not marketed by the tenant or the landlord, but not actively occupied. Shadow vacancy does not appear in any published broker series. It surfaces in building walks (lights off, badge swipes thin), in Kastle / building IoT utilization data, in tenant credit deterioration, and in renewal-cycle behavior at the comp-set level. The institutional underwriter estimates it explicitly, because it is the most important forward-looking risk signal the published reports cannot capture. The shadow vacancy section below walks the three-form taxonomy.

The reconciliation discipline: when the analyst pulls the CBRE Q1 2026 Figures (18.6% national vacancy, 12.7% prime vacancy), Cushman's MarketBeat (20.2% overall vacancy, 18.4% direct, 101 msf national sublease availability), and JLL's Q1 2026 read (+3.5 msf net absorption), the vendors differ even on direction. CBRE reports positive net absorption for an eighth consecutive quarter; Cushman reports -4.0 msf for Q1 and +5.2 msf on a four-quarter rolling basis. Headline vacancy differs by 160 bps between CBRE (18.6%) and Cushman (20.2%); Cushman defines its own universe as competitive inventory, excluding owner-occupied and federally owned buildings, so the vendors' inventories are not identical. The analyst picks one source as the methodological anchor (for example CBRE for the national headline, Cushman for the sublease leading indicator) and reconciles the others against it. The output is not a single number but a stratified read: direct vs. sublease vs. gross vs. shadow, by class and vintage, at the submarket level.

Sublease as the Leading Indicator

The CBRE, JLL, and Cushman quarterlies lead with headline vacancy. The institutional practitioner reads sublease first. Sublease availability is the strongest revealed-preference demand signal in the office market: corporate tenants put space on the sublease market when they have too much and pull it back when they have just enough or not enough. Cushman dates the peak in national sublease space to Q1 2024, and the balloon that built to it was the demand-destruction signal. Since then the decline has been steady: eight consecutive quarterly declines through Q1 2026 (101 msf), and Cushman's Q2 2026 release puts sublease space at 96 msf, 28% below its Q1 2024 peak. That decline is the firming signal that headline vacancy will follow, with a lag.

The Q1 2026 sublease story, by Cushman & Wakefield's MarketBeat:

• National sublease availability: 101 msf. Down 3.4% quarter-over-quarter, down 13.6% year-over-year. Eighth consecutive quarterly decline. Four-quarter rolling net absorption exceeded 5.2 msf, its highest total since the first half of 2020.

• Twelve markets with greater than 500,000 sf year-over-year sublease declines. The leaders: San Francisco (−2.2 msf), Midtown Manhattan (−2.1 msf), Dallas (−1.9 msf), San Jose (−1.4 msf), and Minneapolis/St. Paul (−1.1 msf). SF and Midtown Manhattan are the canonical gateway-recovery stories, with sublease leading the headline vacancy improvement. Dallas's sublease decline, notably, is firming despite overall vacancy still sitting at 25.6% (Cushman), so the leading indicator is faster than the headline.

• Sublease as a share of vacancy. On Cushman's Q1 2026 basis, sublease accounts for 1.8 points of the 20.2% overall vacancy rate, roughly 9% of vacant space (1.8 / 20.2), with direct vacancy the other 18.4 points. Sublease is a small share of the stock, which is why its direction, more than its level, is the signal that the demand side of the market is firming.

The reverse signal - submarkets where sublease is still climbing - is the tell for continued demand weakness. The institutional underwriter who sees a sublease series still climbing in a target submarket discounts the recovery thesis materially. The discipline is to walk three quarters of sublease trajectory, not just spot, and to read sublease in the context of the tenant base (a finance-heavy submarket with sublease falling is firming; a tech-heavy submarket with sublease still climbing is still adjusting).

Q1 2026 sublease trajectory by submarket (Cushman & Wakefield MarketBeat Q1 2026). Sublease as the canonical leading demand indicator. When the analyst opens a submarket file, the sublease trajectory chart is the first chart they pull - before the headline vacancy series, before the absorption series.

Hybrid Work: The Unresolved Demand Question

Most office market commentary in 2026 treats hybrid work as settled: "the office is not dead, the office has changed." The institutional underwriter does not have that luxury. Hybrid work is the unresolved underwriting variable that drives the 2026-2030 demand curve, and the empirical record is mixed enough that the prudent approach is to model it as a sensitivity input, not a settled fact.

The four empirical references the institutional reader integrates:

• Kastle Systems Back-to-Work Barometer. Per Propmodo (December 2025), badge-swipe data across 2,600 buildings and 41,000 businesses in ten major metros. For the week of December 8, 2025 the barometer averaged 56.3% weekly occupancy, a post-pandemic record, and A+ Class buildings ran 78.8%. This is the demand-side empirical floor. Kastle's baseline is the average weekly first-swipe activity in a three-week window in February 2020, set at 100% to reflect normal peak occupancy rather than maximum capacity, so the 56.3% reading is about 44 points below that baseline (100 - 56.3 = 43.7). The trajectory is up; the level is still well below the pre-2020 norm. See Kastle's December 2025 release, Kastle's Back-to-Work Barometer, and Propmodo's coverage.

• Stanford WFH Research (Bloom et al., SIEPR). The academic empirical anchor. The Stanford and Atlanta Fed Survey of Business Uncertainty (more than 1,000 executives, fielded February 2025) puts work from home at 21.2% of paid days. Planned return-to-office mandates, if fully implemented, would trim that to 20.8%, a 0.4 percentage-point shift. Only 12% of executives with hybrid or remote workers reported plans for a mandate in the coming year, and the authors note that even the small decline may never happen. A February 2025 NBER working paper by the same researchers estimated that work-from-home days account for about a quarter of all paid workdays in the U.S. See the SIEPR release on return-to-office mandates.

• JLL workforce benchmark. JLL's Global Occupancy Planning Benchmark Report 2026 (May 19, 2026; 84 organizations representing 716 million square feet of portfolios) finds that fully remote work has fallen to 10% of the workforce, down from 18% in 2025, while the three-to-four-day cohort jumped to 55%, up 19 percentage points in a single year. 62% of organizations now require a fixed number of in-office days, up from 49% a year earlier. See JLL's May 2026 benchmark release.

• The RTO mandate tracker. JLL research reported in July 2025 found that 54% of employees at Fortune 100 companies were under five-day office requirements (5% in 2023) and 41% under hybrid policies, with average required attendance of 3.8 days per week (2.6 in 2023), per Fortuneand Bisnow. Per Bisnow, Amazon and JPMorgan Chase implemented five-day policies in Q1 2025 and Google told several teams to be in the office three days a week. The question for the underwriter is whether the mandate wave sustains beyond the current labor-market cycle that is enabling it.

Hybrid work empirical evidence as of the latest releases. The institutional reader integrates the badge-swipe demand floor (Kastle), the academic empirical work on structural WFH share (Stanford / Bloom), the corporate workforce composition data (JLL), and the RTO mandate tracker. Translating to demand: each one-day change in average "days in office per week" (20% of a five-day week) maps to a roughly proportional change in space need, before accounting for density and desk-sharing, modeled as a sensitivity input against the portfolio's geographic and tenant-industry exposure.

The underwriting translation: hybrid work is best modeled as a demand-curve sensitivity, not a point estimate. The SIEPR estimate that fully implemented RTO plans would shift WFH by only 0.4 pp is a survey of executive intentions, not a forecast, but it suggests mandates alone are unlikely to reverse hybrid work. The demand recovery in the broker data (Cushman's four-quarter rolling net absorption above 5.2 msf) has to be underwritten on its own evidence, whether it is driven by employment growth, formal policy shifts, or the trophy-tier flight to quality. The conservative underwriter holds Kastle's December 2025 56.3% reading flat, models 0% growth in days-in-office over the hold, and lets supply-side discipline (CBRE's 1.3 msf of Q1 2026 completions, the lowest quarterly total since 1990, plus the conversion pipeline) and selective sublease firming carry the recovery thesis. The aggressive underwriter assumes Kastle drifts up an assumed 5-8 pp over a five-year hold as policy formalization continues and the 5-day-mandate cohort expands. The institutional model carries both as bookends.

The 2026 Submarket Spread

National averages mask the picture. On Cushman's Q1 2026 data, overall vacancy ranges from 15.1% in Miami and 16.6% in Nashville to 31.6% in San Francisco and 33.3% in Seattle, against a 20.2% national rate. (CBRE puts Midtown Manhattan prime vacancy at 2.9%, a prime-only reading on a different basis.) The institutional underwriter does not underwrite to the national. The submarket is the unit.

The framework groups markets into two tiers: gateway and Sun Belt. Within each tier, the 2026 spread is significant.

The five market-tier reads, walked (vacancy figures are Cushman Q1 2026 overall vacancy):

• Gateway recovering (Midtown Manhattan). Midtown overall vacancy fell to 18.3% in Q1 2026, from 20.9% a year earlier, with CBRE putting Midtown prime vacancy at 2.9%. Midtown asking rents were $76.96/sf and Midtown South $80.94/sf. Sublease availability fell −2.1 msf YoY in Midtown, and Cushman credits the growth of the artificial intelligence sector for strong absorption in tech-ecosystem markets such as Manhattan (+1.7 msf in Q1).

• Gateway still repricing (San Francisco, Seattle). San Francisco vacancy was 31.6% in Q1 2026, down from 34.3% a year earlier (270 bps), and sublease fell −2.2 msf YoY, the largest decline of any market, signaling that the recovery is underway in San Francisco but from a higher vacancy base. Seattle (33.3%, up from 29.8% a year earlier) has not turned and is the highest of the markets charted.

• Gateway softening (Boston, Chicago, DC). All three have higher vacancy than a year earlier: Boston 18.5% (from 16.4%, up 210 bps), Chicago 26.2% (from 23.2%), and Washington, DC 23.2% (from 21.6%). These markets are not on the recovery curve yet; the underwriter models them as ongoing risk exposures rather than recovery plays.

• Sun Belt low vacancy among markets charted (Miami, Nashville). Miami (15.1%) and Nashville (16.6%) are the lowest-vacancy of the larger Sun Belt markets charted here (smaller Sun Belt markets such as Charleston at 7.7% and Las Vegas at 12.5% run lower in Cushman's table) and have been essentially flat year over year (14.9% and 16.5% a year earlier). Miami's asking rent was $65.22/sf.

• Sun Belt softer (Austin, Phoenix, Dallas, Atlanta, Houston, Charlotte). Austin (27.1%), Phoenix (26.2%), Dallas (25.6%), Atlanta (25.0%), Houston (24.9%), and Charlotte (24.2%) all run above 24% overall vacancy. Austin's vacancy declined 130 bps quarter-over-quarter (28.4% to 27.1%), one of the 100+ bps declines Cushman highlights. Dallas shows sublease firming materially (−1.9 msf YoY) despite the elevated headline vacancy, suggesting a lag rather than a structural problem.

The Q1 2026 submarket spread, Cushman & Wakefield overall vacancy by market. National averages mask the picture; the spread between Miami (15.1%) and Seattle (33.3%) is 18.2 points, or 1,820 basis points. CBRE's Midtown prime reading (2.9%) is a prime-only figure and is not comparable with these all-class rates. The institutional underwriter reads each submarket against its tier and its own three-quarter trajectory, not against the national.

The cross-cutting structural read: construction completions of 1.3 msf in Q1 2026 per CBRE are the lowest quarterly total since CBRE began tracking in 1990 (Cushman counts just under 3.0 msf of deliveries, the third-lowest quarterly total in 14 years). Supply discipline is a tailwind that is easy to underappreciate. The markets with falling vacancy (Midtown Manhattan, San Francisco, Austin, Dallas) are benefiting partly from demand growth, partly from supply-side discipline (no new construction adding to the overhang, and Cushman notes that inventory has shrunk for five straight quarters), and partly from the flight-to-quality bifurcation that pulls demand into trophy / Class A+ stock. The markets still working through overhang (SF, Seattle, Chicago) need both demand recovery and continued supply discipline, plus the conversion pipeline to relieve the structural excess. The class-and-vintage stratification matters: see the sibling article ontrophy / Class A vs. Class B repositioning for the flight-to-quality framework that makes this submarket spread a within-asset spread, not just an across-asset one.

Shadow Vacancy: Three Forms

Beyond direct vacancy and sublease availability there is shadow vacancy - space technically leased and not on the market but unoccupied by the tenant. Shadow vacancy is invisible to the published broker series. It surfaces in building walks (lights off at 10am, badge swipes thin, sublease conversations beginning), in Kastle / building IoT utilization data where the underwriter has access to it, in tenant credit deterioration, and in renewal-cycle behavior at the comp-set level. It is a supply overhang the published series do not capture, and the institutional underwriter estimates it explicitly when the lease ladder on the comp set requires it.

The three forms of shadow vacancy, walked:

• Form 1 - Post-RTO right-sizing shadow space. Tenant moved from 5 days in office to 2-3, kept the existing lease, and is using, for illustration, 40-50% of the leased footprint. Most common on 7-10 year leases signed before 2020 that are still in term, when space was planned for 5-day occupancy. These tenants are not in distress; they are simply waiting out the lease term. The renewal probability at expiration is materially lower than the historical norm - the tenant will renew at a smaller footprint, will sublease the surplus, or will let the lease expire and consolidate into a smaller premises elsewhere. Common in gateway CBDs with finance / professional-services tenant bases.

• Form 2 - Corporate downsizing shadow space. Tenant has laid off staff or shrunk the business unit and is paying out the remaining lease term. Tracked imperfectly through workforce data (BLS metro-level employment by NAICS sector), tenant credit deterioration, and 10-K disclosures for public tenants. The renewal probability is near-zero; at lease expiration the space comes onto the direct vacancy series. The institutional underwriter who is reading shadow vacancy in a tech-heavy submarket (San Jose, Austin, Seattle) in 2026 is largely reading Form 2.

• Form 3 - Deferred-decision shadow space. Tenant has not yet committed to a renewal vs. sublease vs. early termination vs. negotiated lease modification. The lease is intact, the tenant is occupying the space at variable utilization, and the decision is being deferred until the broader market resolves. Most common in 2025-2026 with 12-24 months of remaining term and a tenant balance sheet that allows the option value of waiting. Renewal probability is uncertain; a common starting assumption, which is illustrative, is a 50/50 renewal probability, adjusted by tenant industry and current utilization signal.

Quantifying shadow vacancy is hard, and no published broker series measures it. As an illustrative assumption (not a published statistic), shadow vacancy adds 5-15% of the leased stock in high-WFH-exposure submarkets (gateway CBDs, tech-heavy nodes), versus 0-3% in low-WFH-exposure submarkets (Sun Belt suburban Class A serving in-person tenants, medical office, government-anchored buildings). The underwriter's discipline: walk the building during normal business hours, pull the lease expiration ladder on the comp set, layer Kastle / building IoT utilization where accessible, identify which leases are likely Form 1 vs. Form 2 vs. Form 3, and discount the renewal probability accordingly when projecting the stabilized rent roll.

The renewal-probability discount framework, with assumed inputs rather than market data: take a building where 50% of the rent roll is exposed to high-WFH-likelihood tenants, 30-40% of that bucket sits in a shadow form (Form 1, 2, or 3), and the historical renewal rate is 70%. The shadow share of the rent roll is 15-20% (0.50 x 0.30 to 0.50 x 0.40). If those tenants renew at half the base rate (35%), the blended renewal rate falls by 15-20% x 35 points, or 5.3-7.0 points (about 525-700 bps), from 70% to roughly 63-65%. The underwriter also lengthens the marketing period assumption by an assumed 3-6 months on the rolling leases and raises the TI / free rent concession assumption on net-new leases. Shadow vacancy does not change in-place rent, which is contractually due until expiry; it changes the used share of leased space and the rollover risk. A building that looks 92% leased on the published rent roll can have only about 78-82% of the building physically used (92% leased x an assumed 85-89% of leased space in use), so renewal probability and rollover downtime should be underwritten from the used share. The sibling article on office TI, LC, free rent, and effective rent walks the leasing-economics layer that integrates with the shadow read.

The 2026 Distress Overlay

Office CMBS delinquency is at record levels in 2026. The Trepp CMBS office delinquency series hit an all-time high of 12.34% in January 2026 (up 103 basis points, from a prior record of 11.76% in October 2025) before pulling back 114 basis points to 11.2% in February, per Trepp's CMBS delinquency reports. A one-month pullback after a record reading does not establish a turn; the institutional reader tracks the series through the following months rather than treating February as resolution.

The supporting distress data, integrated:

• Vintage analysis (Trepp / Commercial Observer). In Trepp's 2024 maturity cohort, 57% of office CMBS loans failed to pay off at maturity. For comparison, across all property types in the same 2024 maturity wall, 60% of 2014-vintage loans paid off at or before maturity (29% did not) and 42% of 2019-vintage loans did (47% did not). The 2014 and 2019 figures cover all asset classes, so office alone is not a like-for-like series across vintages.

• The maturity wall (Newmark). Newmark's April 2024 estimate, as reported by Bisnow, was that about $2 trillion of CRE debt would mature over the following three years, including $929 billion due in 2024 alone, with $670 billion of the loans maturing over those three years "potentially troubled," mainly office and multifamily loans. These are all-property-type estimates from 2024, not office-specific or 2026 figures. For 2026 itself, the Mortgage Bankers Association puts scheduled CRE maturities at $875 billion, of which $148 billion is secured by office properties (as reported by Commercial Observer, March 2026).

• The rate-cap squeeze. Illustrative arithmetic, not a market statistic: an office property underwritten in 2017-2019 at a 4.50-5.00% senior rate and 60-70% LTV that refinances at 6.00-6.50% on the same loan balance sees interest-only debt service rise by roughly a third. At constant NOI, DSCR falls by about 24% (4.75% / 6.25% = 0.76 at the midpoints), a material shortfall before any value decline. That shortfall is a driver of modification and extension activity: rather than force resolution at the maturity date and crystallize a workout sale, the special servicer extends.

• The OPI Chapter 11 worked example. Office Properties Income Trust (OPI), with 72 affiliated debtors and roughly 122-124 properties totaling about 17.2 million square feet across 29 states and DC, had a confirmation hearing scheduled for April 22, 2026 and an Effective Date required by June 3, 2026 under its restructuring support agreement milestones, as of April 2026 case materials. The plan projected $272.9 million in dispositions in May-December 2026, with Cash Basis NOI growing from $145.5 million (May-December 2026) to $231.4 million (2030). OPI is a portfolio-level workout of the 2026 cycle and the operator example the institutional analyst opens when modeling a similar workout.

The institutional reading of the distress wave is two-sided. For stabilized holders, distress is a comp-set risk: workout sales reset the submarket transaction comp set lower, which compresses appraised values and shrinks refinanceable LTV bands even on assets that are themselves performing. For opportunistic buyers, distress is the central 2026 entry opportunity. CBRE describes stabilizing fundamentals and improving liquidity leading to "more normal levels of office investment activity" in Q1 2026.

The bridge-debt overlay is integral to the distress story. A material share of the 2024-2026 office acquisitions have been financed with bridge debt to allow the buyer to execute a lease-up or repositioning plan before permanent financing. The bridge structure introduces floating-rate and exit-cap risk that the institutional underwriter models explicitly - see the sibling article on bridge loans, floating-rate risk, and exit assumptions for the debt structure that is fueling much of the 2026 office workout activity. The CMBS structure on the maturing legacy debt is covered in the sibling on CMBS conduit vs. SASB, defeasance, and yield maintenance.

The Institutional Workflow

With the framework laid out, the question becomes: how does the practitioner produce a defensible institutional office market analysis report? The answer is a structured nine-step workflow that integrates the broker quarterlies, the demand-side empirical data, the distress overlay, and the submarket spread into a one-page IC-ready output.

Two methodology notes that experienced practitioners build into the workflow. First, source reconciliation: the institutional analyst does not just pick one source and run. The CBRE Figures number, the JLL Office Outlook number, the Cushman MarketBeat number, and the CommercialEdge number are each computed off a slightly different survey universe, a slightly different submarket definition, and a slightly different class-stratification methodology. In Q1 2026 the national vacancy headline differed by 160 basis points between CBRE (18.6%) and Cushman (20.2%), and the two disagreed on the sign of quarterly net absorption; the gap can be larger in submarkets where one source has thin coverage; the disciplined output names which source is the anchor and notes the reconciliation rather than presenting a single number as if it were definitive.

Second, the demand-side read in Step 7 is where the framework departs from the broker quarterlies. Kastle, RTO mandate exposure, and submarket-level NAICS employment growth are not in the CBRE / JLL / Cushman reports natively. The institutional analyst pulls them as independent overlays. The submarket whose vacancy is improving but whose Kastle reading is flat is improving on supply discipline and lease churn, not on demand expansion - a fragile recovery. The submarket whose vacancy is improving and whose Kastle reading is rising is improving on actual demand recovery - a durable recovery. The two look identical at the headline level. The Step 7 overlay is what distinguishes them. The methodology mirrors the institutional comp-set discipline covered in the multifamily-cluster sibling on rent comp analysis: the practitioner reads broker data through a structured framework, never as a substitute for the framework.

The output of the nine-step workflow is the one-page institutional office market analysis report that an acquisitions analyst hands into IC, that a capital markets professional includes as the market section of a BOV, that an asset manager uses as the market context in a portfolio variance review, that a debt underwriter cites in the market-risk paragraph of a CMBS or bridge-debt underwriting memo. The output is not the data - the underlying broker quarterly reports already contain the data. The output is the structured institutional reading that makes the data legible against the deal in front of the practitioner.

Try It in Apers

Related Articles

• Office Underwriting: TI, LC, Free Rent, Effective Rent - the leasing-economics layer that integrates with the shadow-vacancy and renewal-probability discounting framework.
• Office Lease Analysis: Gross vs. NNN and Expense Stops - the lease structure pillar; the comp-set economics that feed Step 6.
• Trophy / Class A vs. Class B Repositioning - the flight-to-quality bifurcation that makes the submarket spread a within-class spread as well as an across-market one.
• Rent Comp Analysis: Building Institutional Comp Sets for Multifamily Underwriting - the analytic-workflow analog in the multifamily cluster; the same broker-data-as-anchor discipline.
• CMBS Conduit vs. SASB, Defeasance, and Yield Maintenance - the CMBS structure on the legacy office debt feeding the Trepp delinquency series.
• Bridge Loans, Floating-Rate Risk, and Exit Assumptions - the bridge debt fueling 2026 office workouts and recapitalizations.

Sources

• Cushman & Wakefield - U.S. Office MarketBeat Q1 2026.
• Cushman & Wakefield - U.S. Office MarketBeat reports (Q2 2026 release).
• MBA Newslink - CBRE: Office Market Stabilizes Amid Rising Demand, Limited New Supply (April 29, 2026).
• HB Capital - Office CRE Q1 2026: The Selective Recovery Is Real.
• Trepp via MBA Newslink - Trepp: CMBS Delinquency Rate Increases in January, Office Hits New High (February 5, 2026).
• Trepp via MBA Newslink - Trepp: CMBS Delinquency Rate Falls in February (March 5, 2026).
• Trepp via CRE Daily - Office CMBS delinquency, January 2026.
• Commercial Observer - Five- and 10-Year CMBS Loans: Which Vintage Might Crash the Office Market? (March 24, 2026).
• Bisnow - Newmark: $2T In Debt Maturing By 2026, $670B Of It 'Potentially Troubled' (April 2, 2024).
• chapter11cases.com - Office Properties Income Trust Approaches Confirmation on $2.4 Billion Restructuring (April 13, 2026).
• Bisnow - Office-To-Resi Conversions Up 28% From Last Year's Record Levels (March 26, 2026).
• Kastle Systems - Back to Work Barometer Hits All-Time Post-Pandemic Highs.
• Kastle Systems - Getting America Back to Work.
• Propmodo - Office Occupancy Trends and Insights (December 17, 2025).
• SIEPR - Return to office: not everybody is doing it (March 6, 2025).
• JLL - Global Occupancy Planning Benchmark Report 2026 (May 19, 2026).
• Fortune - JLL analysis of Fortune 100 return-to-office policies (July 18, 2025).
• Bisnow - Majority Of Employees At Fortune 100 Firms Now Have 5-Day Office Mandate: JLL (July 23, 2025).

FAQ