Replacement Cost Analysis: The Cost Approach, the Buy-Below-Replacement Thesis, and Insurance Valuation

Key Takeaways

The Cost Approach as the Third Valuation Methodology

Every institutional CRE valuation reconciles three methodologies. Theincome approach, DCF and direct capitalization, values the asset by its cash flows. The sales-comparison approach values it by what comparable assets recently traded for. The third leg is the cost approach: what would it cost to build a functionally equivalent asset today, on like-for-like land, ready to lease? Replacement cost analysis is the cost approach in practice, and it is the third methodology because it answers a question the other two cannot: what is the supply-side floor under this asset's price?

In normal cycles the cost approach is the quietest of the three. When income and comps agree within a few percent, the cost approach confirms the market price and the analyst moves on. But there are moments, such as 1991 after the RTC liquidation, 2009 in the wake of CMBS distress, and the period after the post-2022 cap-rate repricing, when income and sales-comp methodologies both produce values materially below current replacement cost. At those moments the cost approach stops being a confirmation step and becomes the institutional thesis itself: buy below replacement cost. New supply is uneconomic at the prevailing price, existing stock is structurally protected, and the buyer is acquiring a physical asset for less than the cost of building an equivalent one.

This article walks the cost approach at institutional depth. The Appraisal Institute teaches the three approaches to value, and USPAP (published by The Appraisal Foundation) sets the performance standards for appraisal work, but the lens here is capital deployment rather than appraisal compliance. The worked example is a 240-unit Tampa multifamily property in October 2026, where the build-up resolves to a 27% discount to replacement, or 21% before the developer profit row. The article also covers the parallel insurance reinstatement use case, since CRE practitioners field the same vocabulary from both sides of the desk.

What the Cost Approach Includes: Institutional Taxonomy

The Appraisal Institute formulation isIndicated Value = (Replacement Cost New − Total Depreciation) + Land Value. That formulation is correct for appraisal-school work, where depreciation has to be subtracted to arrive at the value of the existing structure. For the institutional "buy below replacement" thesis the math runs in the other direction: what would it cost to build the asset today, brand new, ready to lease. The depreciation step is dropped because the thesis compares market value to the cost of new supply, not to the depreciated value of the existing structure. (Insurance on a replacement-cost basis also uses cost new with no depreciation; see the insurance section below.)

Either way, the cost stack decomposes into six categories. Each one has its own data source, its own inflation profile, and its own role in the institutional underwriting frame. The ranges below are illustrative assumptions used in this article's worked example, not published benchmarks:

• Land. Market-rate land for like-use development, on the same parcel size and zoning envelope. Pulled from comparable land sales within the submarket, trended for any recent move. Land is the most volatile leg of the stack across cycles. For the Tampa example, assume multifamily-zoned land at $1.0–1.5M per acre for infill sites and $0.5–0.8M per acre for suburban garden sites; the example uses an infill site at $1.2M per acre.

• Hard costs. The construction itself: sitework, structure, exterior, interior finishes, MEP, vertical transportation, and equipment installation. Quoted per square foot for commercial product, per unit (all-in including parking) for multifamily. Tracked against the ENR Construction Cost Index for inflation and against RSMeans or Marshall & Swift for current cost data. For the example's Class B+ garden-style multifamily, assume hard costs of $200–240/SF of net rentable, or roughly $190–230K per unit including parking; the example uses $217K per unit.

• Soft costs. Architecture and engineering, permits and impact fees, legal, financing costs (origination, interest reserve during construction, loan fees), insurance during construction, property tax abatement carrying costs, and pre-leasing marketing. Assume soft costs of 12–18% of hard costs: the lower end for repeat suburban product with mature permitting, the higher end for urban infill with complex entitlement. The example uses 15.4% ($8M on $52M).

• FF&E. Furniture, fixtures, and equipment. For multifamily, this is the appliance package, model-unit furnishings, leasing-office build-out, fitness equipment, and pool / amenity FF&E. Assume $5–10K per unit ($1.2–2.4M at 240 units). It is often rolled into hard costs in the institutional shorthand; the worked example carries it inside the soft-cost line. Breaking it out matters because FF&E depreciates faster than the building and gets refreshed on its own cycle independent of the rest of the stack.

• Contingency. A reserve against cost overruns, assumed here at 5–7% of hard plus soft. The example uses $4M, which is 6.7% of the $60M hard-plus-soft base. The contingency leg is part of the cost basis because it is part of what a buyer would have to pay to deliver an identical asset today; a thesis that strips out contingency on the grounds that "we wouldn't actually need it" is reading replacement cost optimistically.

• Developer profit. The economic return the developer requires to take entitlement, construction, and lease-up risk over the delivery cycle. Assume 8–15% of total project cost, depending on asset class, market depth, and capital structure; the example uses 8% of the $76M land, hard, soft, and contingency subtotal ($6.08M). For a "would I build this today" framing, developer profit is part of the cost; for a "what would the depreciated structure trade at" framing, it isn't. This article includes it when testing the buy-below thesis, because the thesis compares the market price with what a developer would need to receive to build new supply. The worked example shows both numbers: 27% with the profit row, 21% without it.

In the appraisal-school taxonomy, the cost approach also separates replacement cost fromreproduction cost. Replacement cost is what it would cost to build a functionally equivalent modern asset: a building meeting the same use and accommodating the same demand, built with modern materials and current methods, designs, and layouts. Reproduction cost is what it would cost to build anidentical replica, including any obsolete features the original asset carries. For a 1920s historic-tax-credit office building, reproduction cost is the relevant number because the historic features are the asset's reason for existing; for a 2005 garden multifamily property being valued for institutional sale, replacement cost is the right frame because the buyer would build a 2026 product if they were rebuilding today, not a 2005 product. Institutional thesis work uses replacement cost. Historic preservation and certain insurance applications use reproduction cost. Mixing them produces material errors.

The "Buy Below Replacement" Thesis

The buy-below-replacement thesis is a capital-deployment story that returns whenever the cost of new supply outruns the price of existing stock. The math is simple: in markets where hard-cost inflation has lifted the replacement cost stack faster than transaction prices on existing stock, an institutional buyer can acquire a physical asset for materially less than what it would cost to build an equivalent one. The thesis is not primarily a yield play. It does lift the going-in yield relative to what a developer would earn: in the worked example the acquisition cap is 6.00% while the yield on the $76.0M cost stack (before developer profit) is 4.74%, a gap of 126 bps. But the core of the thesis is structural protection. When market value is well below replacement cost, new supply at current price levels destroys economic value, the construction pipeline slows, and existing stock gains pricing protection over the medium-run cycle.

Three structural factors drive a buy-below setup. First, hard costs: Turner's Building Cost Index headlines report increases in every quarter from Q1 2025 through Q2 2026. Second, rates: the 10-year Treasury closed at 5.28% on October 7, 2026 (FRED DGS10). A higher risk-free rate lifts required cap rates and lowers direct-cap values on existing stock. Third, operating expenses: where insurance, property tax, and labor cost growth outrun rent growth, NOI compresses and income-approach values fall further. The combination lifts replacement cost and lowers market value at the same time.

Three asset classes show up most often in the discount conversation, but the headline discount number is only the starting point. The ranges below are illustrative assumptions for this article. The institutional decision frame is the decomposition: is the discount cyclical(likely to close as comps reset to replacement cost or as construction inflation moderates), or is itstructural (driven by permanent obsolescence in the existing stock that no amount of cap-rate compression will repair)?

Assume Class B office in most markets sits at 30–60% below replacement cost, with midmarket central-business-district product at the deeper end. Most of that gap is structural rather than cyclical: post-2020 demand for traditional office space has reset, and the technical obsolescence of older HVAC, glazing, and floor-plate configurations cannot be remediated at a cost less than the discount to replacement. A 50% discount on an asset that requires 30%-of-replacement capex to compete with new product is a 20% discount net of that capex (50% − 30%), less attractive than the headline suggests. The institutional question on Class B office is whether the basis is low enough to absorb that structural capital plan and still clear required return; in most markets, the answer is mixed.

Assume Sun Belt Class B multifamily sits at 15–25% below replacement. The gap is mostly cyclical: a delivery wave in markets such as Phoenix, Austin, Nashville, Charlotte, Tampa, and Dallas pushes near-term vacancy up and rent growth down, compressing NOI and depressing direct-cap valuations. If construction starts then fall and the forward delivery pipeline drops below absorption, the thesis is: buy below replacement now, let supply absorb, and ride the rent-growth recovery as the pipeline clears. The framework generalizes across the Sun Belt with market-specific adjustments. Pocket models likeAQ-110 run this underwriting against a current cost basis.

Anchored retail, assumed at 10–20% below replacement, is a different decision tree: the discount is anchor- dependent. Grocery-anchored centers with strong national anchors (Publix, Kroger, H-E-B, Wegmans) on long leases should trade nearer replacement; centers with weaker anchors (regional grocers, soft-goods, off-price) or expiring anchor leases should carry the deeper discount. The buy-below thesis on retail requires anchor underwriting at the same depth as the asset itself.

Core industrial in primary markets is assumed to trade near parity with replacement cost (95–105% in the figure), and in supply-constrained submarkets possibly through it on a scarcity premium. The buy-below thesis doesn't apply there. It can apply to small-bay flex industrial in tertiary markets, where a discount to replacement rests on a different (cyclical, mostly land-driven) story tracked byAQ-401.

RSMeans, Marshall & Swift, and the Cost Database Ecosystem

Institutional replacement cost work relies on a small number of cost databases, and most institutional shops triangulate across two or three to size the hard-cost leg. The names that show up in replacement cost analyses are RSMeans and Marshall & Swift, with ENR and Turner publishing the inflation indices that trend last-quarter data to today.

• RSMeans Data Online (a Gordian product).A construction cost database of unit prices, building assemblies, and facilities repair and remodeling costs, adjustable to location in the U.S. and Canada, with quarterly updates. Used by contractors, architects, owner's representatives, and cost estimators, and a common input to hard-cost sizing in replacement cost work.

• Marshall & Swift Valuation (Cotality).A replacement cost data product used by appraisers, assessors, insurers, and lenders. It is delivered as residential and commercial manuals with localized cost tables by occupancy and construction class, and as SwiftEstimator online software that applies regional multipliers for local labor and material conditions. Cotality notes its replacement costs exclude land and other items unless specifically added to the estimate; see the mistakes section below.

• ENR Construction Cost Index.Engineering News-Record publishes a Construction Cost Index and a Building Cost Index, each with a materials and a labor component, for 20 cities and a national average. Used to trend last-quarter or last-year cost data forward to current pricing.

• Turner Building Cost Index (TBCI).Turner Construction publishes the TBCI quarterly. It is determined on a nationwide basis by labor rates and productivity, material prices, and the competitive condition of the marketplace. Used as a triangulation check against ENR.

The Appraisal Institute teaches the cost approach, and USPAP, published by The Appraisal Foundation, sets the performance standards for appraisals that use it. The institutional discipline for a hard-cost leg is to pull two independent sources, reconcile the difference, and document the reconciliation in the underwrite, not to rely on a single database without challenge.

Worked Example: 240-Unit Tampa Multifamily, October 2026

A stabilized 240-unit Class B+ garden-style multifamily property on a Tampa infill site, marketed for institutional sale in October 2026. NOI of $3.6M, broker whisper at a 6.00% cap implying a $60M direct-cap value. All cost inputs below are illustrative assumptions. The underwriter's institutional question: how does $60M compare to what it would cost to build an equivalent asset today, and does the gap support a "buy below replacement" thesis?

Walk the replacement cost build-up:

Table 1: Tampa multifamily replacement cost build-up, October 2026 (illustrative inputs). The 27% discount sits just above the 15–25% illustrative range for Sun Belt Class B multifamily because the stack includes developer profit. Without the profit row the discount is 21.1% ($16M / $76M).

The 27% discount is the institutional thesis test. Two sensitivities show how much of it rests on the inputs. Dropping the profit row takes the discount to 21.1%. Pricing the land at a suburban-garden $0.65M per acre (midpoint of $0.5–0.8M) instead of $1.2M cuts land to $6.5M, the subtotal to $70.5M, and replacement cost with profit to $76.14M, which gives a discount of 21.2%. The site type and the land price have to be consistent with the product being replaced.

The next questions follow directly. Is the discount cyclical or structural? For this example, assume Tampa Class B+ multifamily is weak because of a supply wave, new starts have fallen, and the forward pipeline sits below absorption; the underwriter would test those assumptions against submarket supply data. On that basis the discount is mostly cyclical.Does the asset have any structural depreciation that should be netted from the discount?Garden-style Class B+ built in the 2010s carries some functional obsolescence (smaller closets, less flexible work-from-home space, mid-cycle HVAC); assume that is worth 3–5% of replacement versus new product. What's the going-in yield on the implied basis?At $60M acquisition price and $3.6M NOI, the going-in cap is 6.00%, which is 72 bps over the 5.28% 10-year Treasury (FRED DGS10, October 7, 2026). What would a developer earn? Yield on cost is $3.6M / $76.0M = 4.74% on the cost stack before developer profit, 126 bps below the acquisition cap. Yield on cost is measured before developer profit because the hurdle return is what compensates the developer (on the $82.1M figure with the profit row it would be 4.39%). At an assumed 6.50–7.50% yield-on-cost hurdle for multifamily development, the cost basis a developer could support is $3.6M / 7.50% = $48.0M to $3.6M / 6.50% = $55.4M, far below the $76.0M cost stack. That gap is the evidence that new supply is uneconomic at current prices.

The buy-below-replacement frame doesn't replace the income-approach underwriting; it complements it. The income approach asks "what does this asset earn?"; the cost approach asks "what would it cost to replace?"; the gap between them is the structural protection the buyer is acquiring. At 27% in this case, the protection is meaningful. The deal underwrites at a 6.00% going-in yield, the replacement cost ceiling sits well above the basis, and the cyclical-discount decomposition is defensible at IC.

When the Cost Approach Beats Income or Sales-Comparison

The cost approach is the right primary methodology, not just a confirmation step, in four institutional contexts.

Development feasibility. For ground-up development, replacement cost is the basis; the developer is literally paying it. Yield on cost (stabilized NOI ÷ total project cost) must clear the required return on that basis, assumed in this article at 6.50–7.50% for multifamily. The income approach (what will it earn at stabilization?) and the sales-comparison approach (what would it trade at?) are inputs into the yield-on-cost calculation, not free-standing valuation methodologies. The cost approach is the framework. The pocket model that runs this build-up for ground-up multifamily and mixed-use development isDV-001 (Ground-Up Development Pro Forma).

Distressed and lease-up properties. When an asset has below-market occupancy, in-place NOI doesn't reflect stabilized economics. Direct capitalization on in-place NOI undervalues; DCF requires assumptions about lease-up pace and stabilized economics that can be challenged. The cost approach provides an independent value floor that doesn't depend on operating assumptions, useful for deeply distressed acquisitions and for lender loan-to-value testing on lease-up product.

Newly-built assets with no T-12. A property in its first 12 months of operation has no trailing income history. Year-1 underwriting requires pro-forma NOI that's defensible against the cost approach: if the underwriter's stabilized NOI implies a value below replacement cost, the model is probably understating economics; if it implies a value materially above replacement, the model is probably overstating them.

Special-purpose properties. Self-storage, hospitality with limited comps, data centers in tertiary markets, manufacturing flex space with custom configurations: assets where neither comp depth nor income predictability supports a credible income or sales-comp underwrite. The cost approach is sometimes the only methodology that produces a defensible value.

Insurance Reinstatement Valuation: The Parallel Use Case

Institutional CRE owners run replacement cost analyses for a second purpose: insurance reinstatement valuation, also called Insurance-to-Value (ITV). Where the income-approach valuation answers "what is this asset worth as a cash-flow stream?", the insurance reinstatement valuation answers "if this asset burns down or floods tomorrow, how much will it cost to rebuild?" The two numbers are usually different, sometimes materially so, and the gap is institutionally important.

Three concepts define the insurance vocabulary that practitioners need to keep straight:

• Replacement Cost (RC) coverage. The policy pays the cost to replace the damaged property with materials of like kind and quality, without any deduction for depreciation (IRMI). This tracks the cost the owner actually faces in a total-loss scenario. The policy definition is narrower than the appraisal definition above: unendorsed standard commercial property forms do not cover the increased cost of rebuilding to current building codes (IRMI, ordinance or law coverage), and Cotality's replacement cost definition likewise excludes code improvements, demolition, and debris removal (Cotality). Code-upgrade coverage is available by endorsement, so those exposures need their own limit review.

• Actual Cash Value (ACV). Commonly calculated as the cost to repair or replace the damaged property minus depreciation; fair market value and the broad evidence rule are the other methods (IRMI). On an ACV basis the depreciation deduction can leave the owner with an under-funded rebuild, which is why replacement cost, not ACV, is the basis for an ITV calculation.

• Coinsurance. A coinsurance provision penalizes the insured if the limit carried is less than a specified percentage (commonly 80 percent) of the value of the insured property. The policy pays no more than the loss multiplied by the ratio of the limit carried to the amount required (property value on the date of loss multiplied by the coinsurance percentage), less the deductible (IRMI). The proration is linear in the shortfall. The base is the value of the insured building, so land is not part of it.

On a replacement-cost basis, the ITV calculation is the full replacement cost new of the insured structure, with no depreciation deducted; replacement cost less depreciation is the ACV basis. Exposures that sit outside the building replacement cost, such as debris removal, code-compliance uplift, and lost rents during reconstruction, are sized separately and tied to the coverages or endorsements that pay for them. For institutional portfolios, ITV reviews happen annually, with the cost basis refreshed against current RSMeans or Marshall & Swift data. In this article's example, the allowance for those separate exposures is an assumed 15–25% of hard cost.

For the Tampa worked example, the building reinstatement base is the $52M hard + $8M soft + $4M contingency = $64M. Land ($12M) is excluded because it is not part of the rebuild, and for this example developer profit is excluded as well. An assumed 18% allowance on the $52M of hard cost for the separately endorsed exposures adds $9.36M, for roughly $73.4M of total limits to review. Under an 80% coinsurance clause the amount required on the $64M building value is 0.80 × $64M = $51.2M. An owner carrying $60M (the market value) clears that requirement and faces no coinsurance penalty, but is still $4M short of the $64M rebuild cost in a total loss, and about $13.4M short of the $73.4M figure. That the $60M market value clears the requirement is a coincidence of this example, not a rule. If the cap rate rises to 8.00%, direct-cap value falls to $3.6M / 8.00% = $45.0M. An owner who insures to that market value carries 45.0 / 51.2 = 87.9% of the required amount, and every partial loss is paid at 87.9 cents on the dollar before the deductible (a $1M loss pays about $879K), with a $19M shortfall on a $64M total loss. The income-approach market value and the insurance reinstatement value answer different questions and must be calculated separately.

How to Model the Cost Approach in Excel

The cost approach fits on a single tab with three sections: cost stack build-up, value reconciliation, and discount-to-replacement decomposition.

Section 1: Cost stack. Six rows, one per cost category (land, hard, soft, FF&E, contingency, developer profit), plus a per-unit and total column for each. The worked example folds FF&E into soft costs and so shows five rows. Pull hard-cost line items from RSMeans or Marshall & Swift by metro and use class, trended forward via ENR CCI to the model-as-of date. Size soft costs as a percentage of hard (the example assumes 12–18%, depending on asset class and entitlement complexity) and contingency at an assumed 5–7% of hard + soft. Add land as a separate row, pulled from comp sales within the submarket. Add a developer profit line at an assumed 8–15% of the cost subtotal, and keep it switched on for both the ground-up underwrite and the buy-below-replacement test, since both compare against the cost of delivering new supply. Show the result with and without the profit row so the reader can see how much of the discount the convention drives. The output of Section 1 is Total Replacement Cost.

Section 2: Value reconciliation. Three rows pulling values from the three approaches: direct-cap value (fromthe cap rate pillar'sNOI ÷ cap rate calc), DCF value (from the DCF tab), and sales-comp value (from the comp set table). When one is materially different from the others, document why. Reconciliation is a judgment about the reliability and relevance of each approach for the asset, not a fixed weighted average, so record the reasoning for the value conclusion and for how much reliance the cost approach gets, which shifts toward cost for development or distressed work.

Section 3: Discount decomposition. Two cells: total discount = (replacement cost − market value) / replacement cost, and structural-vs-cyclical decomposition. The structural component is the depreciation a buyer would have to net out: functional obsolescence (low ceilings, dated HVAC, no fiber connectivity), structural deficiencies (deferred maintenance backlog, code non-compliance), or economic obsolescence (the submarket is structurally below trend for reasons not fixable by capex). The cyclical component is everything else, the part of the discount that closes as comps reset or as construction inflation moderates. The decomposition is the IC-ready output of the analysis.

Common Mistakes

Seven errors that distort replacement cost analyses in institutional underwriting:

• Anchoring to land cost rather than replacement cost when the market is in oversupply.In a delivery-wave market, the institutional buyer's reflex is to size the basis off recent land comps and walk away if land is "fully priced." But the relevant floor is replacement cost, land plus build-out, not land alone. An asset trading at 75% of replacement may be acquired at a basis well above land cost and still be a defensible buy-below deal, because the buyer is acquiring a stabilized, lease-up-complete asset for less than they could deliver one through ground-up. The discipline is to anchor to replacement, not to land cost in isolation.

• Treating replacement cost as a value estimate instead of a value floor. Replacement cost is what it would cost to build new. Market value can sit well above replacement cost in strong markets and well below in weak ones. The cost approach establishes the floor and the cap-rate ceiling implied by new-supply economics; it does not itself produce a value estimate. Mixing the framings produces valuations that are wrong on both sides of the cycle.

• Using stale RSMeans data without trending via ENR CCI. Hard costs move every year. Cost figures from an older RSMeans edition need to be trended to the as-of date via the ENR Construction Cost Index for the relevant metro, not accepted as published. In the worked example, each 1% of un-trended hard cost (about $0.52M) carries through soft cost, contingency, and profit to roughly $0.69M of replacement cost, which moves the discount by about 0.6 points (26.9% to 27.5%). A cost analysis on un-trended data understates replacement and understates the discount to replacement.

• Assuming a cost database figure covers land, code upgrades, and demolition.Cotality states that its Marshall & Swift costs do not include land, landscaping, sidewalks, driveways, or sewer and water systems unless specifically added, and that its replacement cost does not account for code improvements, demolition, or debris removal. A hard-cost figure pulled from a database is a starting line item, not the stack. Add land, site work, and the other legs explicitly.

• Ignoring economic obsolescence in deep-discount situations. A Class B office asset trading at 65% of replacement cost (a 35% discount) may look like an institutional steal, until the decomposition shows that 30 points of the discount are economic obsolescence (work-from-home has reset office demand in this submarket permanently, and no amount of cap-rate compression closes that gap). The remaining 5-point cyclical discount may not justify the underwriting effort. The institutional discipline is to decompose the discount into structural and cyclical components, not to react to the headline.

• Mixing replacement cost and reproduction cost. Replacement cost = functionally equivalent modern asset. Reproduction cost = identical replica including obsolete features. The two diverge for older buildings and for assets with historic, decorative, or specialty features. Using reproduction cost in a buy-below-replacement thesis on a 2005 multifamily property overstates the replacement number by including features (10-foot popcorn ceilings, oak built-ins, a specific kitchen layout) that a 2026 developer wouldn't replicate. The convention is replacement, not reproduction, except for historic preservation and certain insurance applications.

• Insuring to market value instead of reinstatement value. The market-value number from the income approach is not the right ITV input. Owners who insure at market value, because that's what shows up in the partnership financial statements, can face coinsurance penalties on partial losses and under-funding on total losses. Insurance reinstatement valuation is a separate calculation, sized off full replacement cost new of the building (no depreciation deducted, land excluded), with separately endorsed exposures reviewed alongside it. The two should be calculated independently and reconciled annually.

Related Articles

Replacement cost is the cost-side leg of the institutional valuation framework. Related deep-dives in the valuation cluster:

• Cap Rate Calculator and Formula: the pillar. NOI ÷ Value, the formula's three rearrangements, asset-class benchmarks. The income-approach side of the three-methodology reconciliation.
• Cap Rate Decomposition: Risk-Free Rate, Risk Premium, and the Gordon Growth Build: the build-up framework for the cap rate that produces the income-approach value, on the other side of the discount-to-replacement comparison.
• DCF vs. Direct Capitalization: When to Use Which: the income-methodology choice. The cost approach is the third methodology; this article covers the choice between the two income variants.
• Going-In Cap vs. Exit Cap: Modeling the Spread: the exit-cap framework that determines the terminal value the discount-to-replacement comparison is run against.
• Terminal Value, Reversion, and Exit Cap Across the Hold Period: the Gordon Growth applied to the DCF terminal year, with the cost-approach floor running underneath the reversion value.
• NOI: Institutional vs. Broker Calculation: the NOI definition that drives the income-approach value the cost approach is compared against.

FAQ

Sources

• RSMeans Data Online (Gordian)
• Cotality, Marshall & Swift Valuation
• Cotality, How to understand market value versus replacement cost?
• Engineering News-Record, Construction Economics (Construction Cost Index and Building Cost Index)
• Turner Construction, Turner Building Cost Index
• The Appraisal Foundation, Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP)
• Appraisal Institute, appraisal education and resources
• IRMI, replacement cost (RC)
• IRMI, actual cash value (ACV)
• IRMI, coinsurance provision
• IRMI, ordinance or law coverage
• Federal Reserve Economic Data, 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (DGS10)