Dark Store Re-Tenanting: Big-Box Vacancy, Backfill Math, and the 2024-26 Institutional Playbook

Key Takeaways

What "Dark Store" Means (Disambiguation)

"Dark store" carries two distinct meanings in commercial-property vocabulary, and the search-engine entity graph treats them as a single confused term. This article is about the first; we acknowledge the second only to disambiguate.

Dark store (institutional CRE sense, our subject). A vacated big-box retail asset — typically 20,000 to 200,000 SF — that has lost its operating anchor through bankruptcy, lease non-renewal, footprint rationalization, or corporate consolidation. The space sits non-revenue-producing while the landlord pursues re-tenanting (same-format re-lease, subdivision into junior anchors, or redevelopment). The institutional vocabulary — "dark anchor," "ghost box," "going-dark clause" — treats the asset as a CRE workout problem with measurable downtime, TI/LC cost, and a junior-anchor backfill cohort. This is the framing used by open-air shopping center REITs (Brixmor, Kimco, SITE Centers, Regency, Acadia), by REPE shops underwriting value-add retail, and by CMBS B-piece buyers stress-testing dark-anchor risk.

Dark store (fulfillment sense, not our subject). A purpose-built or converted retail-format facility operated as an e-commerce micro-fulfillment center — closed to walk-in customers, designed for pick-pack workflows. The vocabulary was popularized during the pandemic by Whole Foods / Amazon, Kroger / Ocado, Gopuff, Getir, Instacart, and similar operators. The Targomo, ShipBob, Kibo, and Modern Retail literature on dark stores belongs to this fulfillment intent. Some recently-closed fulfillment dark stores have themselves become re-tenanting problems (Gopuff's 2022–23 contraction is the canonical case), but when this happens, the asset re-enters our institutional CRE sense as a vacated retail box — the operational intent doesn't change the underwriting playbook.

The remainder of this article is about the institutional CRE sense exclusively. We discuss the 2024-26 vacancy wave (the scale and the operator-level data), the backfill cohort (who is leasing the space and at what box-size tier), the re-tenanting underwriting stack (downtime, TI/LC, bridge-to-perm refinancing, in-place vs market-rent reconciliation), and the dark-store property-tax-theory backdrop that makes vacant-box valuation a systemic concern for owners of occupied centers.

The 2024-26 Institutional Vacancy Wave

The 2024 through 2026 period produced the densest concentration of large-format retail bankruptcy closures since the 2017–19 cycle (Toys R Us, Sears, Sports Authority, Payless). Four operators account for the bulk of the institutional supply:

• Big Lots — filed Chapter 11 in September 2024; announced going-out-of-business sales across approximately 963 stores in December 2024 after the initial sponsor purchase agreement collapsed. A subsequent partial reorganization preserved a smaller store count under new ownership, but net institutional vacancy from the proceeding sits in the 1,000-store range. Typical Big Lots format: 25,000–40,000 SF junior-anchor box in power centers and grocery-anchored centers.

• JOANN Fabric and Crafts — filed Chapter 11 twice within twelve months (March 2024 first filing, January 2025 second filing) and entered liquidation in early 2025, announcing closure of all approximately 800 stores. Typical JOANN format: 20,000–25,000 SF specialty crafts box.

• Party City — filed Chapter 11 in December 2024 and announced going-out-of-business sales across approximately 700 stores in early 2025. Typical Party City format: 10,000–14,000 SF specialty box. Per Fortune's February 2025 coverage of the bankruptcy auctions, Dollar Tree and Five Below jointly acquired 148 Party City leases — an early institutional read on the backfill cohort that has since extended to Rack Room Shoes, Books-A-Million, Burlington, Hobby Lobby, and Ollie's.

• Bed Bath & Beyond — filed Chapter 11 in April 2023 and liquidated approximately 360 stores plus the buybuy BABY chain through 2023–24. Bed Bath was the cycle's largest single big-box footprint reset (median box size 30,000–45,000 SF); institutional absorption has been ongoing into 2026 because the box-size tier matched two strong backfill cohorts — off-price (TJX, Burlington) and value grocery (ALDI, Sprouts).

The institutional read on the wave is not "retail apocalypse." Two structural conditions absorb the supply. First, national open-air shopping-center vacancy remains historically tight — major brokerage prints have set 2025-2026 retail availability at multi-decade lows, with limited new construction since the GFC leaving the supply curve inelastic. Second, the backfill cohort — off-price, value grocery, value general merchandise, beauty, fitness — is in an aggressive expansion phase that pre-dates the wave. REBusinessOnline's Cynthia Nelson interview captures the institutional landlord stance: "there are just so few stores available" that "vacant properties get gobbled up in months" once the right tenant is identified and the demising work begins. The constraint is execution speed (downtime, TI/LC funding, REA / co-tenancy consent), not absorption demand.

The Backfill Cohort: Who Is Actually Leasing the Space

Institutional big-box backfill in 2024-26 is concentrated in five tenant types. Each plays at a specific box-size tier; mismatching the cohort to the vacant footprint is the most common landlord underwriting error.

Off-price (TJX family, Burlington, Ross). The TJX Companies (TJ Maxx, Marshalls, HomeGoods, Sierra Trading Post, HomeSense), Burlington Stores, and Ross Stores together represent the largest institutional source of junior-anchor backfill demand in 2025-26. TJX alone added approximately 130 net new stores in fiscal 2025 across its banners and has guided continued mid-single-digit unit growth through the cycle. Burlington opened approximately 100 net new stores in 2024 and signaled accelerated expansion targeting former Bed Bath & Beyond and Big Lots boxes specifically. Typical box: 20,000–45,000 SF. The off-price cohort is the institutional landlord's first call on most Bed Bath, Big Lots, and JOANN boxes in the 25,000–40,000 SF tier.

Value general merchandise (Five Below, Dollar Tree, Ollie's). Five Below opened approximately 230 stores in fiscal 2024 and continues to guide low-200s annual unit additions; Dollar Tree accelerated openings into 2025 with 567 new stores tracked through Q3 fiscal 2024 (Fortune coverage of the Party City auction). Ollie's Bargain Outlet has emerged as the closeout-format successor to Big Lots and has openly stated in earnings calls that Big Lots vacancies are a core expansion target. Typical box: Five Below 8,000–10,000 SF, Dollar Tree 8,000–10,000 SF, Ollie's 25,000–35,000 SF. The Five Below / Dollar Tree pair takes Party City and smaller JOANN footprints; Ollie's takes Big Lots footprints.

Value grocery (ALDI, Lidl, Sprouts, Trader Joe's). ALDI announced a 5-year, 800-store U.S. expansion plan in 2023 that has continued through 2026; Lidl continues a slower but steady East Coast expansion. Sprouts Farmers Market opened approximately 35 stores in 2024 and guided 35–40 new openings annually through the cycle. Trader Joe's, despite slower unit growth, remains the most prized grocery backfill because of its inline-rent halo effect. Typical box: ALDI 18,000–22,000 SF, Sprouts 23,000–30,000 SF, Trader Joe's 12,000–15,000 SF, Lidl 30,000–36,000 SF. Value grocers take Bed Bath and smaller former grocery boxes; the operational caveat is permitting and refrigeration infrastructure that conventional dry-goods backfill avoids.

Beauty / specialty (Ulta, Five Below adjacency). Ulta Beauty added approximately 60 net new stores in 2024 and continues to guide low-double-digit net unit growth. Typical box: 10,000–12,000 SF. Ulta is the institutional anchor for smaller specialty backfill in the Party City / JOANN size tier — particularly attractive because it generates above-average inline traffic for co-tenants.

Experiential fitness (Planet Fitness, Crunch, Life Time, Orangetheory). Planet Fitness opened approximately 150 stores in 2024 and continues steady expansion; Crunch and Life Time have selectively taken former Bed Bath, JOANN, and Big Lots footprints in the 20,000–40,000 SF tier. The fitness cohort is secondary to the retail backfill cohorts because fitness use generates lower co-tenant inline traffic and typically carries longer downtime due to HVAC / locker-room build-out requirements ($75–$125 per SF TI vs. $35–$50 for off-price).

The cohort-by-tier matrix has two practical implications for institutional underwriting. First, the landlord's "TBD anchor backfill" assumption needs a specific tenant-type identified at acquisition — "we'll find a junior anchor" is not an assumption, it's an absence of an assumption. The pro forma should name the cohort (off-price, value grocery, fitness) and use that cohort's market rent, TI/LC, and downtime benchmark. Second, subdivision economics are different from same-format re-lease economics: every additional demising wall costs $40–$80 per linear foot, common-area allocations must be re-cut, and every new tenant comes with its own anchor / co-tenancy clause that may interact with the existing inline tenants' rights.

Underwriting a Dark-Store Re-Tenanting: Downtime, TI/LC, Bridge-to-Perm

The institutional re-tenanting underwriting reduces to a cash-flow trough between vacancy and stabilization, funded by some combination of operating reserves, equity injection, and (most commonly) a bridge loan structured to take out into a perm execution at stabilization. The trough has four phases.

Phase 1: Vacancy and listing (months 0–6). The anchor vacates. The landlord engages retail leasing brokers (CBRE, JLL, Newmark, Cushman, plus regional retail specialists like Phillips Edison, SRS, RKF). Landlord-side broker fees on the listing are typically 4–6% of total rent under the new lease, structured as a draw against the first 24–36 months of base rent. During this phase, the box generates zero rent revenue; the landlord pays vacancy carry on taxes, insurance, common-area maintenance contribution, and unrecovered CAM expense on a pro-rata basis. For a 30,000 SF dark anchor in a power center, vacancy carry typically runs $4–$8 per SF per year ($10K–$20K per month).

Phase 2: LOI and lease negotiation (months 6–12). A target tenant is identified and a letter of intent signed. Lease negotiation typically runs 90–180 days for junior anchors. During this phase, the landlord may begin pre-permitting work, environmental and ADA assessments, and preliminary demising plans. Rent commencement is still 12–18 months away, but the future cash flow is now contractually identifiable, which de-risks the asset from a financing perspective.

Phase 3: Build-out and TI/LC funding (months 12–24). The landlord funds tenant improvements per the lease. Institutional benchmarks for 2025-26 deals: off-price $35–$50 per SF landlord TI; value grocery $50–$80 per SF (refrigeration drives higher); fitness $75–$125 per SF (HVAC and locker-room build); specialty / beauty $40–$60 per SF. Leasing commissions (3–5% of total rent under the lease) are paid on lease execution. The build-out window itself runs 4–9 months depending on use; municipal permitting can extend this another 3–6 months in slow-jurisdiction markets.

Phase 4: Rent commencement and stabilization (month 24+). The tenant opens; base rent commences (most leases include a 60–120 day "fixturing period" of free rent before paid rent begins); the asset stabilizes. The new in-place NOI is the recap point — the landlord either holds at the stabilized cap rate or sells / refinances against the new income stream.

Subdivision economics. Splitting a 90,000 SF dark anchor into a 30K Burlington + 25K HomeGoods + 35K ALDI illustrates the typical subdivision arithmetic. The prior anchor rent was $12 per SF triple-net — $1.08M annual. The three junior-anchor rents at 2025-26 institutional market: Burlington at $14 per SF ($420K), HomeGoods at $16 per SF ($400K), ALDI at $14.25 per SF ($499K) — blended $1.32M, a +$240K (+22%) NOI uplift. Subdivision capex: three demising walls at $40K each ($120K); HVAC re-cut to serve three separately metered spaces ($350K); common-area refresh and signage ($180K); tenant-specific TI ($4.5M total — Burlington $35/SF, HomeGoods $40/SF, ALDI $80/SF reflecting refrigeration). Leasing commissions: 4% of total rent over 10 years (3 leases, $528K). Vacancy carry over the 24-month trough: roughly $1.0M.

The full trough capital stack: $5.5M (TI/LC + subdivision capex + vacancy carry). The cap-on-cost yield on the $5.5M, against the +$240K incremental NOI, is 4.4%. That yield does not justify the trough capital on a yield-on-cost basis — what justifies the deal is the cap-rate compression that follows stabilization. A dark anchor on a center transacting at a 9.0% cap rate (reflecting vacancy risk discount) re-prices to a 7.0% cap rate at full stabilization. On the stabilized $1.32M NOI, the value moves from $14.7M (at 9.0%) to $18.9M (at 7.0%) — a $4.2M value lift on $5.5M trough capital, or roughly 76% return on the trough capital alone, before considering the underlying inline center's value.

Bridge-to-perm financing. The trough is typically funded with a bridge loan structured to take out into a permanent or CMBS execution at stabilization. Institutional bridge terms in 2025-26: 65–75% LTC, SOFR + 350–500 bps, 3-year initial term with 1–2 extension options, interest-only, typically with a future-funding facility for TI/LC and vacancy carry. The bridge underwrites to the stabilized debt yield (typically requiring 8.5–10% on the stabilized NOI), which is the lender's confidence test that the perm execution will support payoff. The perm execution at stabilization — typically a 10-year fixed CMBS or life-co loan at 60–65% LTV against the new $18.9M value — returns the bridge with the cap-rate compression captured.

The institutional read on bridge-to-perm dark-store deals: the bridge lender prices the vacancy execution risk into the rate, the equity prices the cap-rate compression, and the operating sponsor takes the re-tenanting execution risk. The deal works when the backfill cohort is genuinely identified (not "we'll find someone"), the LOIs progress on schedule, and the build-out doesn't blow past 18 months. When it doesn't work, the bridge extends, the cap rate doesn't compress, and the deal becomes a workout.

The Dark-Store Property-Tax Theory: A Systemic Risk to Occupied Centers

"Dark store theory" is a tax-assessment litigation strategy — not a real-estate workout strategy, but it bears on the institutional underwriting because successful dark-store litigation lowers the assessment base for entire occupied-center cohorts, not just the litigated stores. Every open-air shopping center underwriter should understand the doctrine and its current state.

The argument, originated by Walmart, Lowe's, Target, Menards, and similar national big-box operators starting in the late 2000s: the assessed value of an occupied big-box property should be set by reference to the market sale prices of comparable vacant properties (the "dark store" comparables), not by income capitalization on the operating rent or by reproduction cost. The premise is that big-box buildings are functionally obsolescent the moment they are vacated — built to a corporate prototype, lacking a deep second-user market — so the highest-and-best-use value is the dark-store comparable, not the in-place economic use. The result, where the theory wins: assessed values drop 40–60%, often retroactively across multiple tax years, with the lost revenue absorbed by municipalities and (in some states) other property classes.

The doctrine has been contested in 21+ state courts and assessment tribunals since 2014, with mixed but increasingly municipal-favoring results. The watershed institutional event was the Wisconsin Supreme Court's February 2023 unanimous ruling against the theory in the Delavan, Plover, and Wauwatosa consolidated cases — "a significant blow to the dark-store theory" per Bloomberg Tax's coverage, which observed that "dozens of property tax appeals by Walmart Inc., Target Corp., Lowe's, and other big box retailers may evaporate by the end of the year" following the decision. Michigan, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Texas have taken varying positions in their own court systems and legislatures; the Governing.com analysis cataloged the multi-state policy variation as of the early-2020s cycle.

The institutional underwriting implication: occupied-big-box assessment is structurally less stable than occupied-inline assessment because the dark-store comparables litigation creates a downside path for the assessed value that doesn't exist in other property classes. A landlord underwriting a power center with Walmart, Target, Lowe's, or Home Depot anchors should stress-test property tax pass-throughs against the scenario that the anchor wins a dark-store assessment appeal, reducing the assessment by 40%, which would typically lower the anchor's reimbursable tax expense by a similar percentage — saving the anchor but reducing the per-SF CAM pool that funds shared operating expenses and pushing more burden onto inline tenants. The litigated portfolios are well-known (Walmart and Lowe's are the most aggressive); the institutional pricing convention is to underwrite a 20–40 bps cap-rate premium on power centers with high dark-store-litigated anchor concentration.

How to Model It

The dark-store re-tenanting model has six computational pieces. Treating any of them as an afterthought produces a pro forma that under-states downside or over-states value-add yield.

Tab 1 — Vacancy schedule and downtime assumptions. Build a month-by-month occupancy schedule for the vacated suite. For each candidate backfill scenario (same-format re-lease, subdivision into 2 / 3 / 4 junior anchors, alternative use), specify the months-to-LOI, months-to-lease, months-to-rent-commencement. Institutional benchmarks: 6–9 months to LOI, 3–6 months to executed lease, 9–15 months to rent commencement (lease-to-commence period). Total: 18–30 months from vacancy to first rent dollar in subdivision scenarios. Same-format re-lease (rare in 2024-26 because the comparable anchor doesn't exist) can complete in 6–12 months.

Tab 2 — Suite-level lease-up modeling. For each new tenant in the subdivision plan, capture: square footage, base rent ($ per SF), escalations (fixed bumps or CPI), term and option periods, free rent period (typically 60–120 days fixturing), TI allowance ($ per SF), commission (% of total rent), and any landlord work outside TI (HVAC, demising, permitting). The pro forma must combine these into a per-suite cash flow that aggregates to the re-tenanted center NOI.

Tab 3 — Subdivision and demising capex. Demising-wall construction ($40K–$80K per wall for institutional-grade insulation, drywall, structural separation); HVAC re-cut to serve multiple separately-metered spaces ($200K–$500K); utility separation (electric, gas, water meters per suite); common-area refresh and signage ($100K–$300K); ADA compliance updates required by municipal permit. These costs are landlord obligations independent of tenant-specific TI and should not be double-counted in the TI allowance.

Tab 4 — Bridge-to-perm debt schedule. Model the bridge loan separately from the perm execution. Bridge: 65–75% LTC, SOFR + 350–500 bps, IO, 3-year term with future-funding for TI/LC and vacancy carry; interest reserve to cover months 0–18 of negative carry; exit fee typically 0.50–1.00%. Perm execution at stabilization: 10-year CMBS or life-co at 60–65% LTV against stabilized value; the take-out proceeds should pay off the bridge with debt yield clearing 8.5–10%.

Tab 5 — Stabilization scenarios and IRR. Run three cases: (a) base case — subdivision plan executes on schedule, stabilization at month 24, 7.0% exit cap; (b) downside — only two of three suites lease on schedule, stabilization at month 36, 7.5% exit cap; (c) upside — subdivision plan executes ahead of schedule, fourth small-shop suite added, 6.75% exit cap. The downside case typically blows the IRR by 400–600 bps relative to base; the upside case typically adds 200–400 bps. The institutional read is that downtime risk is fatter than cap-rate-compression upside; the bridge lender prices that asymmetry into the loan.

Tab 6 — Property-tax stress test. For power centers with Walmart, Target, Lowe's, Home Depot, or Menards anchors, run a scenario where the anchor wins a dark-store-theory assessment appeal reducing the anchor's assessed value by 40%. Compute the impact on the per-SF CAM and tax pass-through pools, the resulting inline-tenant burden, and the operational risk that inline tenants invoke gross-up or cap provisions in their leases.

Build It in Apers

Common Mistakes in Dark-Store Re-Tenanting Underwriting

• Underwriting "TBD anchor backfill" instead of a named cohort. The 2024-26 backfill cohort plays at specific box-size tiers: ALDI takes 18–22K, HomeGoods takes 25–30K, Burlington takes 30–45K, Five Below takes 8–10K. "We'll find a junior anchor" is not an underwriting assumption — it's an absence of one. Name the cohort at acquisition and use that cohort's market rent, TI/LC, and downtime benchmark. If no realistic cohort exists at the box size, the subdivision plan is the assumption, not the same-format re-lease.

• Mismatching box size to backfill cohort. Trying to lease a 45,000 SF vacated Bed Bath as a single-tenant box to ALDI (which prototypes 18,000–22,000 SF) misallocates broker time and produces 30+ months of downtime that the pro forma didn't budget. The 30K–50K tier is a subdivision-default tier — underwrite it as such.

• Ignoring co-tenancy and REA constraints on subdivision. Some inline tenants carry co-tenancy clauses that condition rent obligations on the operating status of named anchors; some REAs require co-anchor consent for subdivision or use-change. Subdividing a Bed Bath without checking the inline rent roll for co-tenancy interactions can trigger reduced-rent provisions on 15–30 inline tenants while the subdivision plan executes — a cash-flow problem that compounds the trough.

• Underestimating subdivision capex. Three demising walls is not just $120K of wall material. The HVAC re-cut, the separately-metered utility installations, the per-suite ADA upgrades, the signage and common-area refresh, and the contingency on municipal permitting collectively run $500K–$1.5M for a typical three-suite subdivision — before any tenant-specific TI. The pro forma should carry these as landlord capex separate from TI allowance.

• Underwriting bridge interest reserve on optimistic downtime. Bridge loans for re-tenanting deals require interest reserves sized to fund debt service through stabilization. Sizing the reserve on an 18-month rent-commencement assumption when institutional downtime medians are 24–30 months produces a reserve shortfall that the equity has to backfill mid-execution — typically the worst time to recapitalize.

• Missing the dark-store property-tax overlay on power-center underwriting. Walmart, Lowe's, Target, Home Depot, and Menards anchors carry contingent assessment-appeal risk through dark-store-theory litigation. A successful appeal lowers the anchor's reimbursable tax pass-through and shifts CAM burden onto inline tenants. The 21+ states with active litigation are institutional knowledge for power-center underwriters; the 20–40 bps cap-rate premium on high-dark-store-litigated-anchor portfolios is the institutional pricing convention.

• Confusing the cap-on-cost yield with the deal-level return. The cap-on-cost yield on the trough capital (often 4–5%) does not justify the deal on a yield-on-cost basis. The deal works on cap-rate compression at stabilization — the move from a 9.0% vacancy-risk cap to a 7.0% stabilized cap is the institutional value-add return. Underwriting that thinks the 4.4% incremental NOI yield is the answer misses the IRR mechanism.

FAQ

Related Articles

• Retail Underwriting: Anchor Economics and Co-Tenancy Provisions — the anchor-rent and co-tenancy framework that governs how dark-anchor events propagate to inline tenant economics.
• Grocery-Anchored Retail: Below-Market Anchor Rent and Inline Economics — the value-grocery backfill cohort context (ALDI, Sprouts, Lidl) and the inline economics that recover post-stabilization.
• Pad Sites & Outparcels: Ground Lease Economics and QSR Credit — the outparcel monetization wedge that often runs in parallel with anchor re-tenanting on shopping-center value-add deals.
• Net Lease Single-Tenant Underwriting: Credit Spreads and Cap Rate Decomposition — the single-tenant net-lease companion for understanding how stabilized junior-anchor cash flows reprice post re-tenanting.
• Loan Workout — the workout scenario when the bridge-to-perm doesn't take out and the dark-store deal becomes a lender-led restructuring.
• For Retail Operators & Sponsors — the segment context for sponsors and operators executing value-add retail in the 2024-26 vacancy cycle.

Sources

• Fortune, "Dollar Tree and Five Below snatched up nearly 150 defunct Party City stores in auctions this month" (Feb 2025) — the canonical data point on the Party City institutional backfill: 148 leases combined to Dollar Tree and Five Below; additional acquirers Rack Room Shoes, Books-A-Million, Burlington.
• 99% Invisible, "Ghost Boxes: Reusing Abandoned Big-Box Superstores Across America" — the design / journalism reference on adaptive reuse, including the canonical McAllen, TX 123,000 SF Walmart-to-library conversion.
• REBusinessOnline, "Q&A: Best Practices for Filling Vacant Big Box Retail Space" (Cynthia Nelson, FTI Consulting) — institutional landlord-side framing on the re-leasing / redevelopment / demising decision tree.
• VHB, "Repositioning Big Box Retailers" — planning / engineering whitepaper on the repositioning framework (re-lease, redevelop, demise) and entitlement considerations.
• Governing, "The 'Dark Store' Threat to Property Tax Revenues" — the multi-state policy survey on the dark-store property-tax-theory litigation and municipal response.
• Bloomberg Tax, "Localities Gain Ground on Big Box Stores in Property Tax Fights" — coverage of the February 2023 Wisconsin Supreme Court unanimous rejection of dark-store theory in the Delavan, Plover, Wauwatosa consolidated cases.
• Council of State Governments, "Dark Store Theory: How States Are Addressing Retail Property Taxes" (2022) — multi-state legislative response survey; cite by name.
• Wisconsin Examiner, "Without Dissent, Wisconsin Supreme Court Strikes Blow to Dark Store Tax Theory" (Feb 2023) — government-journalism coverage of the watershed institutional ruling; cite by name.
• Retail Dive coverage of the JOANN, Big Lots, and Party City bankruptcy proceedings (2024-2025) — the trade-publication record of store counts, filing dates, and asset disposition; cite by name.
• CNBC coverage of the Bed Bath & Beyond Chapter 11 filing (April 2023) — the institutional record of the cycle's largest single big-box footprint reset; cite by name.
• TJX Companies, Burlington Stores, Ross Stores, Five Below, Dollar Tree, ALDI, Sprouts, and Ulta Beauty 2024-2025 investor communications — the operator-level expansion-pace data that defines the backfill cohort capacity; cite by name from earnings releases and 10-Ks.